Evaluating the dynamic employment effects of training programs in East Germany using conditional difference-in-differences by Bergemann, Annette et al.
Discussion Paper No. 04-41
Evaluating the Dynamic Employment Effects
of Training Programs in East Germany 
Using Conditional Difference–in–Differences 
Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger
and Stefan SpeckesserDiscussion Paper No. 04-41
Evaluating the Dynamic Employment Effects
of Training Programs in East Germany 
Using Conditional Difference–in–Differences 
Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger
and Stefan Speckesser
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0441.pdfNon{technical Summary
After German uni¯cation, Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) were implemented
at a large scale in East Germany in order to prevent unemployment. These programs
mainly consisted of training and temporary employment schemes. In 2002, more
than a decade later, the German Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fÄ ur
Arbeit, BA) still spent around e 20 Billion (¼ 0.9% of the GDP) for ALMP. About
50% of this budget goes to East Germany even though the labor force in East
Germany is less than one sixth of Germany as a whole. Quite a signi¯cant share
of the labor force in East Germany has been participating in programs of ALMP
since 1990. In light of persistently high unemployment, the e®ectiveness of ALMP
in East Germany is often questioned.
Contributing to this debate, we estimate the employment e®ect of public sector
sponsored training programs in East Germany at the individual level for the time
period 1990 to 1999. Training programs were intended to provide skills to the in-
dividuals that are in demand in a market economy but not in su±cient supply due
to the former educational system. Consequently, regarding the number of partic-
ipants, training was the largest ALMP program in East Germany. Our empirical
analysis focusses on the group of individuals who belonged to the active labor force
in 1990. This group was hit fully by the transformation shock. We use data from
the Labor Market Monitor for the state of Sachsen{Anhalt (Arbeitsmarktmonitor
Sachsen{Anhalt LMM{SA).
This paper ¯rst provides an overview on training programs in East Germany and de-
velops the methodology for estimating treatment e®ects of training programs based
on a dynamic employment model. Then, the evaluation of the program involves
estimating separately the e®ects on the outcome variables transitions between em-
ployment and nonemployment depending on the employment status in the previous
month. When evaluating the average e®ect of labor market policy for the treated
individuals, it is important to estimate the counterfactual average nontreatment out-
come for the treated individuals based on similar nontreated individuals in order to
avoid a possible bias induced by the selection into the programs. We implement non-
parametric kernel matching based on the estimated propensity score for treatment.
This way, we intend to control for selection bias based on observed characteristics.
In a second step, we take before{after di®erences in outcomes either using a static
conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator (CDiD) or { as an innovation in this
paper { a dynamic conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator in hazard rates
(CDiDHR) to account for a remaining potential selection bias due to time invariant,
unobserved characteristics. We therefore estimate the e®ect of the program on the
before{after di®erences in outcomes without explaining their levels.
We argue that estimating CDiDHR is more appropriate since future employment
chances are state dependent, i.e. the probability to be employed in the next monthdepends strongly upon whether an individual is employed in the current month. The
literature using CDiD so far has not yet treated employment as a dynamic process.
Another aspect to address is the possibility that before the participation in a labor
market program, the employment situation of the future participants deteriorates
disproportionately (Ashenfelter's Dip). We take this into account by not using
the situation shortly before the start of the program when doing the before{after
comparison.
Furthermore, there is the possibility of multiple sequential treatments which might
re°ect \carousel e®ects" and which are quite important in the context of a Eu-
ropean welfare state. Carousel e®ects denote a situation where individuals keep
participating in labor market programs because the programs do not increase their
employment chances but they provide transfer payments to the participants. We ad-
dress this issue by ¯rst estimating the e®ect of training as a ¯rst treatment. Then,
we estimate both the incremental e®ect of a second treatment, which can be an-
other training program or a job creation program, and the combined e®ect of such
sequences.
Important ¯ndings are: Training as a ¯rst treatment shows insigni¯cant e®ects on
the transition rates. The e®ect of program sequences and the incremental e®ect of
a second program on the reemployment probability are insigni¯cant. However, the
incremental e®ect on the probability to remain employed is slightly positive. The
estimated e®ects do depend heavily on the time the programs took place. Overall,
our results are not as negative as previous results in the literature and it is unlikely
that training on average reduces considerably the future employment chances of
participants. Of course, this is still far from saying that training was a success!
On the methodological side, our study suggests that observed characteristics in the
survey data set used here are not su±cient to control completely for selection into
treatment. In addition, it also shows, that the likely presence of Ashenfelter's Dip
has to be addressed when implementing a di®erence{in{di®erences estimator.
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Appendix 321 Introduction
After the formation of the German \Social and Economic Union" in 1990, the East
German economy underwent enormous changes. It had to transform from a com-
mand driven backward economy to a market economy at an unprecedented speed.
The transformation process brought about high unemployment in East Germany.
To increase the employment chances of the unemployed, the German government
decided to provide on a high scale Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) in East
Germany. These programs mainly consisted of training and temporary employment
schemes. In 2002, more than a decade after the reuni¯cation, the German Federal
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit, BA) still spent around e 20 Billion
(¼ 0.9% of the GDP) for ALMP (Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit, 2003). About 50% of
this budget is spent in East Germany even though the labor force in East Germany
is less than one sixth of Germany as a whole. Quite a signi¯cant share of the labor
force in East Germany has been participating in programs of ALMP since 1990.
Contributing to the debate on the e®ectiveness of ALMP, this paper estimates the
employment e®ect of public sector sponsored training programs in East Germany
at the individual level for the time period 1990 to 1999. In the early 90s, training
was often considered to be the most e®ective among the ALMP programs. It was
intended to provide skills that are in demand in a market economy but not in
su±cient supply due to the former educational system. Consequently, regarding the
number of participants, training was the largest ALMP program in East Germany.
In our empirical analysis we focus on the group of individuals who belonged to
the active labor force in 1990. This group was hit fully by the transformation
shock. We use data from the Labor Market Monitor for the state of Sachsen{Anhalt
(Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen{Anhalt LMM{SA), a data set allowing for monthly
information on employment and program participation.
We implement a semiparametric conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator
(CDiD) (Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd, 1998). In the light of the state depen-
dence of the employment process we extend the CDiD approach to use transition
rates between di®erent labor market states as outcome variables instead of exclu-
sively use employment rates in levels as often done in the literature.
For the implementation of the CDiD estimator, we apply propensity score matching
in the ¯rst stage and then estimate average e®ects of treatment{on{the{treated.
The analysis matches treated individuals to nonparticipants using kernel matching
to account for selection on observables. Selection on time invariant unobservable
characteristics is controlled for using a conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estima-
tor. Our inference uses a bootstrap approach taking account of the estimation error
in the propensity score. We perform a sensitivity analysis on the implementation
details of the evaluation approach.
1Our results indicate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate than using
unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success criterion
could result in misleading conclusions concerning the e®ectiveness of ALMP pro-
grams. With regard to the transition rates, we ¯nd that the employment e®ects are
mostly insigni¯cant and that there are some signi¯cantly positive e®ects for selected
start dates.
In addition, our results show the usefulness of exploiting the additional information
which transition rates can provide as opposed to unconditional employment rates.
With the aid of transition rates we are able to determine whether ALMP programs
help to ¯nd a job and/or whether they rather stabilize employment. Our results
show signi¯cant variation over time concerning these two outcomes.
We make three additional points in the methodological debate on program evalua-
tion: First, anticipation e®ects regarding future participation or eligibility criteria
(Ashenfelter's Dip) requiring a certain elapsed duration of unemployment for par-
ticipation are likely to a®ect strongly the results of any di®erence{in{di®erences
estimator (Heckman and Smith, 1999). Using institutional knowledge to bound
the start of the Ashenfelter's Dip, we suggest a long{run di®erence{in{di®erences
estimator to take account of possible e®ects of anticipation or participation rules.
Second, we suggest a heuristic cross{validation procedure for the bandwidth choice
which is well suited to the estimation of conditional expectations for counterfactual
variables.
The third point relates to the fact that in East Germany individuals often participate
more than once in a program during a short time period. Some observers (e.g. Hagen
and Steiner, 2000) suggest that multiple program participation occurs because the
participants cannot (or do not want to) ¯nd a job after the end of the ¯rst program.
In order to keep their transfer income (and possibly in order to lower the level of
o±cial unemployment), these persons participate in a further program \carousel
e®ect"). To address this issue, our study estimates the e®ects of participation in
training as ¯rst program and of participation in a second program afterwards, be it
a second training program or a job creation program. Regarding participation in a
second program, we estimate both the incremental e®ect of the second program and
the combined e®ect using our di®erence{in{di®erences approach.1
Former studies on the e®ect of ALMP in East Germany on the individual employ-
ment chances provide mainly negative though unclear evidence, see the surveys in
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2002) and Hagen and Steiner (2000). The existing
studies su®er greatly from data limitations, either they are plagued by a small num-
1Some progress has been made in the methodological literature in order to extend standard
static evaluation approaches to the dynamic selection issue involved here, see Lechner/Miquel
(2001). The requirements on the data when applying the Lechner/Miquel approach are unlikely
to be satis¯ed in our case (see section 3 below) and we are not aware of an actual application of
this approach.
2ber of participants (German Socio-Economic Panel, e.g. Lechner, 1998) or the data
is limited to the early 1990's and does not allow for constructing the employment
history on a monthly basis (Labor Market Monitor for East Germany, e.g. Fitzen-
berger/Prey, 2000).2
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short description of the institu-
tional background for ALMP in East Germany and discusses descriptive evidence.
Section 3 develops the microeconomic evaluation approach used here. The imple-
mentation of the approach is described and the empirical results of the evaluation
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. The appendix includes detailed
descriptive evidence and results.
2 Training in East Germany
2.1 Background
Between 1969 and 1997, training as part of Active Labor Market Policy in Germany
was regulated by the Labor Promotion Act (ArbeitsfÄ orderungsgesetz, AFG). Despite
a number of changes in the regulation over this time period, the basic design of train-
ing programs remained almost unchanged until the AFG was replaced by the new
Social Law Book III (SGB III) in 1998. The German Federal Labor O±ce (Bunde-
sanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit, BA) was in charge of implementing these programs in addition
to being responsible for job placement and for paying out unemployed bene¯ts.
Training programs under the AFG rule fell into four categories:3 Further Vocational
Training (Fortbildung), Re{training (Umschulung), Short{term training (Kurzzeit-
ma¼nahmen nach x 41a AFG) and Integration subsidies (Einarbeitungszuschuss,
xx 33 { 52 AFG). With German uni¯cation, these programs were extended to East
Germany after July 1990 (x 249 AFG). Policy makers intended to foster the adjust-
ment of the East German human capital stock to Western levels. The large and
prolonged use of ALMP was also justi¯ed by equity goals (the standard of living
in East Germany should converge quickly to Western levels) and by political goals
(political stability after a massive transformation shock and avoiding large scale
outmigration).
2Our earlier paper Bergemann et al. (2000), where the impact on employment rates is estimated
for the period 1990 to 1998, is an exception. Reliable administrative data on ALMP has so far not
been made available.
3We ignore German language courses which have di®erent target groups.
32.2 Training under the Labor Promotion Act 1990{1997
Further vocational training (x 41 AFG) consists of the assessment, maintenance, and
extension of skills. The duration of the courses depends on the characteristics of the
participants. The courses regularly take between 2 and 8 months and are mainly
o®ered by private sector training companies.
Re{training enables vocational re{orientation if no adequate employment can be
found because of skill obsolescence. Re{training is supported by the BA for a period
up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certi¯ed vocational training degree.
Short{term training aim at increasing the employment chances by skill assessment,
orientation, and guidance. The courses are intended to increase the placement rate
of the unemployed. Mostly, they do not provide occupational skills but aim at
maintaining search intensity and increasing hiring chances. The courses usually last
from two weeks to two months.
Integration Subsidies involve payments to employers providing employment to pre-
viously unemployed workers who need a training period. The worker earns a regular
wage from the employer. This program is included in o±cial numbers of partici-
pation in training programs. However, it is not analyzed in our empirical analysis
because the data used do not allow to identify it.
Except for integration subsidies, all participants in full{time courses are granted
an income maintenance payment (Unterhaltsgeld) if the conditions of entitlement
are satis¯ed. To qualify, persons must meet the requirement of being previously
employed for a minimum duration during a set period of time, i.e. at least one year
in employment or receipt of unemployment bene¯t or subsequent unemployment
assistance. The set period may be extended for individuals returning to the labor
market.
The income maintenance payment amounts to the same level as unemployment
bene¯ts, i.e. to 67% (60%) of previous net earnings for participants with (without)
at least one dependent child. The income maintenance payments used to be higher
in the early 1990's (see below). If a person does not ful¯ll the requirement of previous
employment, but received unemployment assistance until the start of treatment, the
income maintenance may be paid as well. Participants re{qualify for unemployment
bene¯ts providing an additional incentive for participation. The BA also covers all
the direct training costs such as course fees.
42.3 Changes in Programs and Incentives
During the 1990's, legislation modi¯ed the types of programs, the level of income
maintenance payments, and the eligibility criteria. Short{term training programs
were abolished formally in 1992 and in 1993, a new program started with the same
purpose. However, participants were no longer considered as taking part in training
programs and were therefore recorded as unemployed. Income maintenance pay-
ments were reduced after 1993 from 68% (63%) of the net earnings during previous
employment for participants with (without) children to 63% (60%).
Before 1994, participation in a training program was accessible for participants
without having experienced unemployment beforehand as long as the case worker
considered participation in training as \advisable". This type of training intended
to prevent future unemployment, to increase the labor market prospects of the
employed in the future, or to foster re{integration of individuals returning to the
labor market. Starting in 1994, the access was restricted to individuals ful¯lling the
criteria for \necessary" training which basically restricted the program to formerly
unemployed participants. However, especially in East Germany, the participation
under the weak criterion of \being threatened by unemployment" was still possible.
The changes resulted in a new mix of participants in trainings programs and they
somewhat shifted the focus of training. A credible evaluation strategy has to account
for these changes.
The end of explicit short{term training programs made the remaining programs
longer and more expensive on average. In addition, the remaining program mix
was less explicitly focussed on a immediate placement of participants. The mix of
programs observed after the change is more strongly focussed on providing additional
skills and helping participants to signal their skills. We suspect therefore that, on
the one hand, incentives to participate are stronger on average than for the program
mix before the reform. This may result on average in stronger anticipation e®ects
such that in the prospect of participation unemployed individuals decrease their
search e®ort for a new job.
On the other hand, training programs became less attractive, especially for workers
who are still employed, both due to the lower income maintenance payments and
due to the focus on previously unemployed individuals. Over time, a change in the
selection of the program group occurred restricting training to problem groups with
a priori signi¯cantly lower employment chances.
52.4 Aggregate Participation
Training programs were implemented in East Germany immediately after uni¯cation
(see ¯gure 1): 98,500 persons started to participate during the last three months
of 1990. In 1991, the maximum was reached with 892,145 entries. Only in 1992,
there was a similar magnitude. Afterwards the number was much lower and it went
down to 166,000 in 1997. During the most recent years, participation recovered at a
level slightly above 180,000 re°ecting the ongoing importance of these programs in
East Germany. The share of entries into re{training in percent of training in total
varies between 15% in 1991 and 28% in 1993, the share for integration subsidies
declines from 15% in 1991 to 8% in 1997. No separate ¯gures are available neither
for short{term training and further vocational training for the early 1990's nor for
the subprograms after 1997 due to the change in the regulation.
Stocks of participants show a similar pattern (see ¯gure 2). The maximum was
reached in 1992, amounting to 492,000 participants on average. Participation has
been declining afterwards (2000: 139,700, 2002: 129,000 participants). The trends
for the subprograms (not reported in ¯gure 2) are analogous.
Direct costs for participation paid by the BA (see ¯gure 2, right axis) { income
maintenance, course fees, travel costs etc. { continuously increased over time. In
1991, when short{term training programs still existed, annual costs were at e 8,000
per participant. With e 14,600 in 1995 and the most recent number being e 20,600,
the programs observed became much more expensive over time.
3 Evaluation Approach
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential{outcome{approach to causality
(Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974), see the survey Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999). We
focus on estimating the average causal e®ect of treatment{on{the{treated (TT) in
the binary treatment case.4 TT is given by
E(Y
1jD = 1) ¡ E(Y
0jD = 1) ; (1)
4The framework can be extended to allow for multiple, exclusive discrete treatments. Lechner
(1999) and Imbens (2000) show how to extend standard propensity score matching estimators
for this purpose and e.g. Larsson (2003) provides an application to ALMP in Sweden based on a
large and quite homogeneous treatment and comparison group. Although, it would be a natural
extension in our application to explicitly allow for multiple, exclusive treatments by ALMP, we do
not think that our data is su±ciently rich enough for this purpose. In addition, our analysis is
much more demanding since we argue that matching on observable covariates will not su±ce to
control for selection bias and since we model the e®ects on transition rates between di®erent labor
market states. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to estimating TT for training where the comparison
group is the group of all individuals who either do not participate in any program or who only
participate in other programs where the latter two are weighted by their sample frequencies.
6where the treatment outcome Y 1 and the nontreatment outcome Y 0 are the two
potential outcomes and D denotes the treatment dummy. Our outcome variable of
interest is a dummy variable for employment, possibly conditional on employment
in the previous month resulting in a transition dummy. The observed outcome Y
is given by Y = DY 1 + (1 ¡ D)Y 0. The evaluation problem consists of estimating
E(Y 0jD = 1) since the counterfactual outcome in the nonparticipation situation is
not observed for the participating individuals (D = 1). Thus, identifying assump-
tions are needed to estimate E(Y 0jD = 1) based on the outcomes for nonparticipants
(D = 0).
We apply a conditional di®erence{in{di®erences (CDiD) approach which combines
two widely used concepts to estimate the average nontreatment outcome for the
treated E(Y 0jD = 1). One is to consider the situation of program participants
before treatment (before{after{comparison) and the other is to consider a con-
trol group of comparable persons who did not participate. The major drawback
of the before{and{after comparison lies in the assumption of a constant average
nontreatment outcome over time for the treated population. This is violated, if
over time labor market outcomes change irrespective of participation, i.e. formally
E(Y 0
t0jD = 1) 6= E(Y 0
t1jD = 1) where t0 is a point of time before treatment and
t1 after treatment. Another issue involves participation rules and possible antic-
ipation e®ects of the treatment (Ashenfelter's Dip) resulting in Y 0
t0 already being
a®ected by the treatment in the future. Regarding the selection of an appropriate
control group, it is usually not warranted to assume that the average nonpartici-
pation outcome of the participants is the same as for the nonparticipants, i.e. we
have E(Y 0jD = 1) 6= E(Y 0jD = 0). Thus, a readily available sample estimate for
E(Y 0jD = 0) is not a consistent estimate for the counterfactual E(Y 0jD = 1).
3.1 Selection on Observables and Matching
Assuming the Conditional Mean Independence Assumption (CIA)
E(Y
0jD = 1;X) = E(Y
0jD = 0;X) (2)
implies that the nontreatment outcome of the participants and of the nonparticipants
are now comparable in expectation when conditioning on X. Then, to estimate the
expected nonparticipation outcome for the participants with observable characteris-
tics X, it su±ces to take the average outcome for nonparticipants with the same X.
This is the basis of the popular matching approach, see Heckman/Ichimura/Todd
(1998), Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998), Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999),
or Lechner (1998). This approach estimates the expected nontreatment outcome
for a participant i with characteristics X by the ¯tted value of a nonparametric re-
gression in the sample of nonparticipants at point X. The nonparametric regression
can be represented by a weight function wN0(i;j) that gives the higher a weight to
7nonparticipants j the stronger his similarity to participant i regarding X. For each
i, these weights sum up to one over j (
P
j2fD=0g wN0(i;j) = 1). The estimated TT
is then
1
N1
X
j2fD=1g
8
<
: Y
1
i ¡
X
j2fD=0g
wN0(i;j)Y
0
j
9
=
;; (3)
with N0 the number of nonparticipants j and N1 the number of participants i.
Matching estimators di®er with respect to the weights attached to members of the
comparison group. The most popular approach in the literature is nearest neighbor
matching just using the outcome for the closest nonparticipant (j(i)) as the com-
parison level for participant i, see Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999) and Lechner
(1998). In this case, wN0(i;j(i)) = 1 for the nearest neighbor j(i) and wN0(i;j) = 0
for all other nonparticipants j 6= j(i). Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, Todd
(1998), we implement a di®erent matching approach using a nonparametric local
linear kernel regression to estimate the expected nonparticipation outcome of par-
ticipants with certain characteristics, see also Pagan/Ullah (1999). This amounts to
specifying the weight function based on a kernel function which has as its argument
the distance in terms of characteristics of the individuals.5 This so called kernel
matching has a number of theoretical advantages compared to nearest neighbor
matching. The asymptotic properties of kernel based methods are straightforward
to analyze and it has been shown that bootstrapping provides a consistent estimator
of the sampling variability of the estimator in (3) even if matching is based on close-
ness in generated variables (this is the case with the popular method of propensity
score matching which will be discussed below), see Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd
(1998) or Ichimura/Linton (2001) for an asymptotic analysis of kernel based treat-
ment estimators. We are not aware of similar results for nearest neighbor matching.
It is di±cult to match with respect to a high{dimensional vector of observable
characteristics X (\curse{of{dimensionality"), see Pagan/Ullah (1999). Therefore,
the evaluation literature uses extensively the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
that the CIA in equation (2) implies that participants and nonparticipants become
comparable in expectation when conditioning on the treatment probability P(X)
(propensity score) as a function of the observable characteristics X, i.e.
E(Y
0jD = 1;P(X)) = E(Y
0jD = 0;P(X)) (4)
provided 0 < P(D = 1jX) < 1. This result reduces the matching problem to one
dimension e®ectively using the \closeness" in the propensity score as the weighting
scheme. However, the propensity score has to be estimated. We implement kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score. We take account of the sampling
5We also checked the sensitivity of our results by using nearest neighbor matching without and
with caliper (the latter allows only for matches which are su±ciently close). For our application, it
turned out that the choice of matching approach had no notable impact on the estimated treatment
e®ects. We only report the results using kernel matching.
8variability in the estimated propensity score by applying a computationally quite
expensive bootstrap method to construct the standard errors of the estimated treat-
ment e®ects. To account for autocorrelation over time, we use the entire time path
for each individual as block resampling unit. All the bootstrap results reported in
this paper are based on 200 resamples.
For the local linear kernel regression in the sample of nonparticipants, we use the
Gaussian kernel, see Pagan/Ullah (1999).6 Standard bandwidth choices (e.g. rules
of thumb) for pointwise estimation are not advisable here since the estimation of the
treatment e®ect is based on the average expected nonparticipation outcome for the
group of participants, possibly after conditioning on some information to capture the
heterogeneity of treatment e®ects. Since averaging pointwise estimates reduces the
variance, it is clear that the asymptotically optimal bandwidth should go to zero
faster than an optimal bandwidth for a pointwise estimate, see Ichimura/Linton
(2001) on such results for a di®erent estimator of treatment e®ects.7
To choose the bandwidth, we suggest the following heuristic leave{one{out cross{
validation procedure which mimics the estimation of the average expected nonpar-
ticipation outcome for each period. First, for each participant i, we identify the
nearest neighbor nn(i) in the sample of nonparticipants, i.e. the nonparticipant
whose propensity score is closest to that of i. Second, we choose the bandwidth to
minimize the sum of the period{wise squared prediction errors
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where the prediction of employment status for nn(i) is not based on the nearest
neighbor nn(i) himself and t = 1;:::;T denotes the month (T = 120 for our data).
The optimal bandwidth a®ecting the weights wi;j through the local linear regression
is determined by a one{dimensional search. The resulting bandwidth is typically
smaller than a rule{of{thumb value for pointwise estimation, but this is not always
the case, see Ichimura/Linton (2001) for similar evidence in small samples based
on simulated data. Since our method for the bandwidth choice is computationally
quite expensive, it is not possible to bootstrap it. Instead, we use the bandwidth
found for the sample in all resamples.
6A kernel function with unbounded support avoids some of the problems involved with local
linear kernel regression, namely, that the variance can be extremely high in areas where there is
not a lot of data, see Seifert/Gasser (1996) and FrÄ olich (2001) for a critical assessment of local
linear kernel regression.
7This is also the rationale for researchers using nearest neighbor matching with just the closest
neighbor thus focussing on minimizing the bias.
93.2 Employment Model and Ashenfelter's Dip
We specify the econometric model for employment in order to be clear about which
treatment parameters are estimated. The dummy variable for employment Yit of
individual i in month t exhibits strong state dependence, i.e. holding everything else
constant the probability to remain employed P(Yit = 1 j Yi;t¡1 = 1) given that i is
employed in the previous month is likely to be much higher than the reemployment
probability P(Yit = 1 j Yi;t¡1 = 0) given that i is not employed in the previous
month.8 Therefore, the dynamic employment process for individual i is speci¯ed
using separate outcome equations depending on the state in the previous month as
Yit =
8
<
:
ae(Xi;t) + ±e
i;t;¿Di;t(¿) + ce
i + ue
i;t for Yi;t¡1 = 1 (employed before)
an(Xi;t) + ±n
i;t;¿Di;t(¿) + cn
i + un
i;t Yi;t¡1 = 0 (not empl. before)
(5)
where Di;t(¿) is a dummy variable for treatment in period ¿, ae(Xi;t);an(Xi;t)
are functions describing the state dependent employment probabilities as a °exible
function of observed time invariant characteristics Xi and month t, ±e
i;t;¿;±n
i;t;¿ are
the individual speci¯c, state dependent e®ects of treatment on the employment
probabilities, ce
i;cn
i are state dependent permanent individual speci¯c e®ects, and
ue
i;t;un
i;t are the idiosyncratic, period speci¯c e®ects. To simplify the notation, we
only consider the e®ects of treatment in one period ¿. Furthermore, we assume
that the e®ect of treatment occurs after treatment, i.e. ±k
i;t;¿ = 0 for t < ¿ and
k = e;n.9 We will discuss below Ashenfelter's Dip as linking treatment and the
idiosyncratic error term before treatment. We allow the individual treatment e®ect
±k
i;t;¿ (k = e;n) to depend upon observed characteristics Xi and the individual speci¯c
e®ects ck
i. They are also allowed to vary by i;t; and ¿ conditional upon Xi and ck
i.
For the idiosyncratic error terms, we assume that ue
i;t;un
i;t are mean independent of
treatment in the past.
Regarding the issue of selection bias, the evaluation approach should allow that
treatment Di;t(¿) is a®ected by the observed covariates (Xi;t), by the treat-
ment e®ects ±e
i;t;¿;±n
i;t;¿ and by the individual speci¯c e®ects ce
i;cn
i . Furthermore,
we should not impose strong functional form restrictions on the speci¯cation of
ae(Xi;t);an(Xi;t). The evaluation approach should be as nonparametric as possible
relying on the smallest plausible set of assumptions.
It is often observed, that shortly before the participation in a labor market pro-
gram the employment situation of the future participants deteriorates dispropor-
tionately. A similar ¯nding termed Ashenfelter's Dip was ¯rst discovered when
evaluating the treatment e®ects on earnings (Ashenfelter, 1978). Later research
8In this section, the index i denotes any individual whereas in the remainder of the paper i
applies only to treated individuals.
9This assumption is similar to the timing{of{events approach in the literature using duration
models to estimate treatment e®ects, see Abbring/Van den Berg (2003).
10demonstrated that the same phenomenon can also occur regarding employment, see
Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999), Heckman/Smith (1999), and Fitzenberger/Prey
(2000). We argue that in our context Ashenfelter's Dip is caused by participation
rules or anticipation e®ects. Therefore, we allow that Di;t(¿) can be correlated with
uk
i;¿¡s (k = e;n) with s = 1;:::;ad and ad denotes the begin of Ashenfelter's Dip.
Even though no tough participation rules were applied in East Germany in the early
1990's, it is clear that in most cases unemployment must have lasted some time be-
fore treatment could start. A reason for anticipation e®ects can be that unemployed
workers or workers at the risk of becoming unemployed reduce their search e®ort if
they know that participation in an active labor market program is an option in the
near future. Analogously, unemployed individuals expecting to start a new job in
the future are not likely to receive treatment.
It is conceivable to interpret Ashenfelter's Dip as a treatment e®ect thus violating our
timing{of{events assumption. We stick to this assumption since both anticipation
e®ects and participation rules have no bearing on the economic mechanisms at work
during and after treatment. Therefore, we assume that these preprogram e®ects are
not linked to the outcome variable once treatment has started, i.e. uk
i;¿¡s (k = e;n)
are not correlated with uk
i;t with s ¸ 1 and t ¸ ¿.10
In our empirical analysis, we allow for a maximum length of time (ad months) for
Ashenfelter's Dip. ad is set according to institutional features of the programs under
consideration. After inspection of the data, we set ad conservatively and we let it
vary over time (see section 4.3 and 4.4). While it is likely that shortly after German
uni¯cation the anticipation of program participation occurs only shortly before the
begin of the program and participation rules were applied in a very lax way, ad
increases with the rise of unemployment during the early 1990s.
3.3 Conditional Di®erence{in{Di®erences
While the matching approach addresses selection bias due to observed variables,
selection bias due to unobserved characteristics has to be addressed di®erently. We
allow the selection into treatment to be a®ected by the permanent unobserved e®ects
in our employment model in equation (5). For instance, unobserved characteristics
could be due to di®erences in the motivation of participants or could re°ect that
programs are targeted to individuals with some particular problems in the labor
market.11 The di®erence{in{di®erences estimator can be used when selection e®ects
10This is in contrast to Heckman/Smith (1999) who model the recovery process to be expected
(based on nontreatment outcomes) after the treatment being parallel to the deterioration during
Ashenfelter's Dip. The state dependence in our employment process results in a recovery process
which does not have to be parallel to what happens before the treatment.
11We do not pursue to estimate an econometric selection model since the scarce data do not
allow for credible exclusion restrictions in the participation equation, see section 4.1.
11are additively separable and time invariant. Then, it is possible to use the frame-
work in section 3.1 by merely analyzing the before{after{change in the outcome
variable instead of its level. We implement a conditional di®erence{in{di®erences
(CDiD) estimator using preprogram di®erences in the outcome variable after match-
ing to control for remaining unobservable di®erences. In order to avoid the \fallacy
of alignment" (Heckman/LaLonde/Smith, 1999), we have to take account of possi-
ble preprogram e®ects via Ashenfelter's Dip. We extend the CDiD as used in the
literature to fully capture the state dependence in the employment process.
3.3.1 Conditional Di®erence{in{Di®erences in Employment Rate
Following the approach in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998),12 we use kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score to match participants i and non-
participants j in the same time period t and then the simple CDiD{estimator for
the treatment e®ect on the employment rate13 in period t1 is given by
1
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0
i;t0 ¡
X
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wi;j(Y
0
j;t1 ¡ Y
0
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where period t1 lies after and t0 before treatment of individual i, N1 is the number
of participants i for whom the t1 ¡ t0 di®erence can be determined, and due to
Ashenfelter's Dip t0 must lie before ¿ ¡ ad.14
CDiD is a valid estimator if the employment process in equation (5) does not exhibit
state dependence and if the idiosyncratic error term is conditionally mean indepen-
dent of treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(ui;tjD = 1;Xi) = E(ui;tjD =
0;Xi) = 0 for t ¸ ¿ and t < ¿ ¡ ad, ae(Xi;t) = an(Xi;t), ci = ce
i = cn
i , and
ui;t = ue
i;t = un
i;t. However, the common individual speci¯c e®ect ci does not have to
be conditionally mean independent D and Xi.
3.3.2 Conditional Di®erence{in{Di®erences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR)
Based on the employment model in equation (5), we develop the following Condi-
tional Di®erence{in{Di®erences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR) estimator as an exten-
sion of the CDiD estimator to a state dependent employment process. We simply
12See also Blundell et al. (2003) for an application of the CDiD, where age and regional variation
is used to take account of selection e®ects.
13Although our model is de¯ned in discrete time we use the word `rate', as it can be aggregated
to a probability in discrete time.
14We do not take symmetric di®erences (¿0 ¡ t0 = t1 ¡ ¿1 with ¿0 begin of program and ¿1 end
of program) as in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998) or Heckman/Smith (1999). We think
their approach assumes an implausible symmetry between those e®ects driving Ashenfelter's Dip
and the recovery process after participation, see also discussion in footnote 10 above.
12estimate the treatment e®ect on the probability to be employed via CDiD condi-
tional on employment status in the previous month by
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5 (6)
where l denotes the employment status in the previous month (l = 1 if previously
employed and l = 0 if previously nonemployed), N l is the set of treated individuals
for whom Yi;t1¡1 = Yi;t0¡1 = l, where t1 after and t0 before treatment of individual
i. Nl is the number of individuals in N l. Also, only nonparticipants j for whom
Yj;t1¡1 = Yj;t0¡1 = l. gi is a set of weights to account for the fact that N l does not
include the entire treatment sample. For l = 0 and l = 1, expression (6) estimates
the reemployment probabilities when unemployed and the probability to remain
employed, respectively.
To properly account for selection bias in the nonparticipation outcome, CDiDHR
only requires the idiosyncratic error terms to be conditionally mean independent of
treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(ue
i;tjD = 1;Xi) = E(ue
i;tjD = 0;Xi) =
E(un
i;tjD = 1;Xi) = E(un
i;tjD = 0;Xi) = 0 for t ¸ ¿ and t < ¿ ¡ ad. Analogous
to CDiD, the individual speci¯c e®ects cl
i do not have to be conditionally mean
independent of treatment status D and covariates Xi. Also for CDiDHR, t0 must
lie before ¡ad, i.e. before anticipation and participation rules can take e®ect, because
of the possibility of Ashenfelter's Dip.
A disadvantage at ¯rst glance lies in the fact that using weights gi = 1, CDiDHR
does not identify the unconditional TT E(±k
i;t1;¿jD = 1) but instead the TT
E(±k
i;t1;¿jD = 1;Yt1¡1 = l;Yt0¡1 = l) conditional on the employment status l both in
the previous month (l = 0 if k = n and l = 1 if k = e) and in the month before
the baseline period t0. The latter TT is not the same as the unconditional TT with
the potential treatment e®ects ±k
i;t;¿ being de¯ned irrespective of the employment
status of individual i in the previous month. To estimate the unconditional TT,
it would be necessary both to account for the di®erences in the distribution of the
Xi characteristics and of the individual speci¯c e®ects ck
i with k = e;n, since the
individual speci¯c treatment e®ects in the employment model (5) as well as the ob-
served employment status in the previous month presumably depend upon both Xi
and the ck
i's. Di®erences in Xi and the ck
i's result in a sorting of high employment
individuals into the group of employed individuals in the previous month and vice
versa.
In section 4, we de¯ne the weights gi to integrate out the distribution of Xi in the
treatment sample by using a regression model where the mean e®ect is evaluated at
the average of the Xi in the treatment sample. E®ectively, we then identify the TT
EXi;D=1fE(±
k
i;t1;¿jD = 1;Yt1¡1 = l;Yt0¡1 = l;Xi)jD = 1;Yt1¡1 = l;Yt0¡1 = lg
conditional on the employment status l in the previous month and in the month
13before the baseline period t0 where the outer expectation EXi;D=1 integrates out
with respect to the distribution of Xi in the sample D = 1. Thus, conditioning
on (Yt1¡1 = l;Yt0¡1 = l) only a®ects the distribution of the individual speci¯c
e®ects and the latter is partly controlled for through the correlation between Xi and
the ck
i's. Regarding the information in the ck
i's not controlled for, our treatment
e®ect weights the individual treatment e®ects by the frequencies that individuals
are employed and not employed in the previous period before and after treatment,
respectively.
Our approach estimates the unconditional TT under the following two stringent
conditions: First, the treatment e®ects are conditionally mean independent of the
individual speci¯c e®ects when also conditioning on Xi, i.e. E(±k
i;t1;¿jce
i;cn
i ;Xi) =
E(±k
i;t1;¿jXi). Second, we do observe each treated individual in both employment
states before anticipation and participation rules take e®ect so that the before{
after{di®erence can be calculated for some t0 in the past. The second assumption
is quite innocuous in our application since we consider the preprogram situation up
to 18 months in the past. The preprogram level is then the average transition rate
conditional on the employment state in the previous month. For almost all treated
individuals, these averages are available for both states. The ¯rst condition does
not hold when the selection into treatment depends upon the treatment e®ects ±k
i;t1;¿
conditional upon Xi via the individual speci¯c e®ects. We do not think that the
latter condition is likely to hold.
There is no ready procedure to estimate the unconditional TT by also integrating
out the individual speci¯c e®ects without imposing further stringent assumptions.
Thus, we only integrate out the Xi distribution in the treatment sample. It is quite
plausible that, conditional on Xi, both treatment e®ects ±k
i;t1;¿ are positively corre-
lated with the individual speci¯c e®ects and that the two individual speci¯c e®ects
are positively correlated. Then, our approach will overestimate the TT for the prob-
abilities to remain employed and it will underestimate the TT for the reemployment
probabilities. Given this, we will nevertheless be able to draw conclusions on the
e®ectiveness of training programs based on the estimation results.
3.4 Multiple Treatments and Carousel E®ects
To take into account multiple sequential treatments such that an individual partici-
pates in labor market programs more than once, we extend our evaluation approach
to the analysis of a ¯rst and second treatment. We specify the TT of participation
in a second program compared to the situation of not having participated in this
speci¯c treatment sequence. The treatment dummy D is de¯ned such that D = 1
indicates treatment in this speci¯c treatment sequence and D = 0 indicates all three
other alternatives, i.e. (i) no program participation, (ii) a ¯rst training program and
14no further treatment or another second program not considered here, or (iii) a ¯rst
treatment other than training.
The estimation of the combined e®ect of the sequence of the ¯rst and second treat-
ment is a straight forward application of the single binary treatment case. Indi-
viduals with at most one training program participation D = 0 are matched to
individuals who participate in a second program D = 1. For CDiD(HR), we use the
di®erences between the period after the second treatment and the period before the
¯rst treatment.
To evaluate the incremental e®ect of the second program we suggest the follow-
ing heuristic two step procedure. Based on the timing of events, the incremental
treatment e®ect is estimated by CDiD(HR) using the outcome before and after the
second treatment in the matched sample. Treating previous program participation
as nonemployment, the average incremental e®ect of the second program is obtained.
The matching procedure uses all nonparticipants of the second program, i.e. the es-
timated e®ect relates to the composition of this group. To properly account for
selection into the second treatment, we assume that the impact of the individual
speci¯c e®ects enters the individual treatment e®ects ±k
i;t;¿ for the ¯rst program as
an additive constant. Unfortunately, our approach does not allow for the selection
into the second program to depend directly upon the individual treatment e®ect of
the ¯rst program.
Evaluating the combined and incremental e®ects of multiple program participation,
it is possible to investigate whether multiple treatments occur for individuals with
particularly bad labor market prospects, whether a further treatment improves the
outcome, or whether it just occurs because the participants are unlikely to ¯nd a job
after the ¯rst treatment and this is still the case after further program participation
(\carousel e®ect"). In our approach, a pairwise (\data hungry") evaluation (see
Lechner (1999) and footnote 4 above for the evaluation of heterogeneous treatments)
can be avoided.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
Our analysis uses the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen{Anhalt15 (Arbeitsmarktmoni-
tor Sachsen{Anhalt, LMM{SA) for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. The LMM{SA is
a panel survey of the working{age population of the state (Bundesland) of Sachsen{
15Although the data refer to the state of Sachsen{Anhalt only, the results are likely to be
representative for East Germany as a whole (see Schulz, 1998). For further information on the
data set, see Ketzmerik (2001).
15Anhalt with 7,100 participants in 1997, 5,800 in 1998, and 4,760 in 1999. 1999 is the
last year in which the survey was conducted. Only in the three years used, retro-
spective questionnaires on the monthly employment status between 1990 and up to
December 1999 were included. The monthly data provide all possible labor market
states, i.e. employment, unemployment, or participated in a program of ALMP, as
well as periods in the education system, inactivity, or in military. Individuals who
did not participate in the 1998 survey are recorded until at least September 1997,
those who dropped out in 1999 at least until October 1998.
Selection of Sample
Unfortunately, in the three survey years used the categories of the labor market
states di®er. For compatibility, the data set also includes a combined monthly
calendar for the three survey years (compiled by the ZSH institute). This
calendar distinguishes the following categories: Education, full{time employed,
part{time employed, unemployed, job{creation scheme, training, retirement, preg-
nancy/maternity leave, not in active workforce.
We only consider individuals with complete information on their labor market his-
tory between January 1990 and at least until September 1997 (i.e. individuals who
completed the retrospective question in 1997). The individuals are between 25 and
50 years old in January 1990 and employed before the start of the \Economic and
Social Union" in June 1990. This way, only individuals are included who had be-
longed to the active labor force of the former GDR, who therefore were fully hit by
the transformation shock, and who are not too close to retirement.16 Individuals,
who are later on in education or on maternity leave are excluded completely from
the analysis. The goal is to construct a consistent data base excluding individuals
who have left the labor market completely. In addition, individuals without valid
information on those individual characteristics, on which we build the matching, are
excluded. We aggregate the remaining labor market states to the four categories em-
ployment, which comprises part{ and full{time employment, nonemployment, which
comprises unemployment and out of labor force, training and job creation.
Our outcome variable employment is de¯ned with nonemployment as alternative
resulting in a binary outcome variable. Modeling transitions between unemployment
and being out of labor force is here an impossible task. People move occasionally
back and forth between the two states in the data and it is not obvious whether
the individuals precisely distinguish between unemployment and being out of labor
force, since no formal de¯nition of unemployment is given in the questionnaire.
The resulting sample consists of 5,165 individuals and it is likely to be quite repre-
sentative for the labor force in the former GDR. Table 1 summarizes participation
16Massive early retirement programs were implemented in the early 1990s in order to reduce the
labor force.
16in ALMP based on our data. The two programs considered, Training (TR) and
Job Creation Schemes (JC), were implemented at a large scale. In total, 27% of
our sample participated at least once in one of the two programs. While 13% (689
cases) participated at least once in JC, TR was the most important program with
a rate of 20% (1,021 cases).17 Our data do not distinguish between further training
and retraining. Therefore, the estimated treatment e®ects are an average of the two
programs.
After a ¯rst training program, a second treatment in training or JC occurred in 326
cases, i.e. more than 36% of the 889 cases in a ¯rst treatment in TR participated in
another program at least a second time. Because of the importance of the timing of
events, we di®erentiate between the e®ects of a ¯rst and a second treatment. This
paper focuses on the e®ects of TR, thus restricting ourselves to TR being the ¯rst
treatment. Using the evaluation approach described in section 3, we estimate ¯rst
the e®ects of FTR (participation in training as the ¯rst program) (889 cases) and
then the e®ect of the second treatment for the two sequences TR{TR (150 cases)
and TR{JC (176 cases). No further treatment afterwards is analyzed, since the
number of cases is very small.
Recall Errors
Retrospective data, which in our case covers at least 8 years, entails the danger of
recall errors. In the following, we will argue that recall errors are less problematic
in our analysis than it is typically the case with retrospective data.
First of all, note that the individuals were asked about their employment history
starting with the year 1990. This year constitutes a turning point in the biography
of East Germans, as the political and economic system changed dramatically. The
connection of biographic events with historic events, as done here, typically improves
the validity of recall data (Loftus/Marburger, 1983, Robinson, 1986). Additionally,
starting with the salient year 1990 the individuals had to answer in chronological
order, which is now commonly viewed as the best technique in collecting life history
data in a single survey (Sudman/Bradburn, 1987). Second, our broad de¯nition of
employment states circumvents some of the recall errors which are present when
analyzing more than two labor market states. It helps especially to merge the
states unemployment and out of the labor force. For instance, after some time
in unemployment, women tend to label this as having been out of the labor force
(Dex/McCulloch, 1998). Third, our evaluation design (CDiDHR estimator) allows
for recall errors occurring in the same fashion among treatment and matched control
group. In particular, if both groups forget to mention transitions in a similar way
then the errors simply cancel out.
17The question in the LMM{SA on training does also include privately ¯nanced training. How-
ever, calculations based on the German Socioeconomic Panel for East Germany show that a very
high share of training is in fact public sector sponsored training (in 1993 more than 88%).
17Thus, recall errors in our analysis might only increase the standard errors of our
estimates. However, if we were estimating individual labor market °ows, recall
errors would be more worrying (Paull, 2002) and it might be useful to change the
methodological approach (e.g. following Magnac/Visser, 1999).
4.2 Implementation of Evaluation Approach
We estimate the following ¯ve treatment e®ects: (1) FTR: participation in training
as the ¯rst program, (2) TR{TR: incremental e®ect, (3) TR{TR: combined e®ect,
(4) TR{JC: incremental e®ect, and (5) TR{JC: combined e®ect. For FTR, TR{TR,
and TR{JC,18 the treatment probability (propensity score) is estimated by separate
parametric probit models. Since the data do not provide time{varying information
(except for the labor market status), the regressors are the static observable charac-
teristics education, occupational degree, gender, age, residence (at the time of the
survey) and interactions of gender and education or occupational degree (results can
be found in table 2). The probit model does not model when the participation in
the program actually takes place. We do not think that the data is su±ciently rich
to model the timing. Using a bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the
estimated treatment e®ects, we capture the estimation error in the propensity score.
For matching based on the propensity score, the group of \nonparticipants" fD = 0g
represents the entire sample of individuals who are not participating in the treatment
sequence under consideration but who might be a participant in another program.
We do not match on the employment history shortly before the program (see Lech-
ner, 1998, for such an approach) due to the possibility of Ashenfelter's Dip. Our
CDiD(HR) estimators control for remaining long{run preprogram di®erences after
matching upon the propensity score.
The results of the probit estimates for the propensity score are reported in table 2.
Figures 3 { 6 show the high degree of overlap in the distributions of the estimated
propensity score19 between participants (Treated) and nonparticipants (Nontreated)
for the treatments FTR and TR{TR (the graphs are similar in nature for TR{JC).
The graphs are strati¯ed conditional upon nonemployment and employment in the
previous month, respectively. Since the employment status changes over time and
since after 1997 no complete data is available for all individuals, the overlap can
change over time. Here, the graphs show the overlap of the distributions for the
two months 5/1993 and 5/1997, being representative for other periods. Only in rare
cases, such as FTR in 5/1993 and being previously nonemployed, we ¯nd a slightly
less than perfect overlap. Based on this evidence, there is no serious problem of lack
18Recall from the previous subsection that the evaluation of combined and incremental treat-
ments only di®er regarding the choice of the preprogram period for the CDiD(HR) estimators.
19The graphs depict the ¯tted values of the latent index for the probit model. The estimated
treatment probability is the cdf of the standard normal applied to this index.
18of common support for matching and we match the entire treatment sample.
So far, we have not been explicit about the post program evaluation period. We
use two di®erent starting points in time, which are widely used in the literature:
The evaluation of treatment e®ects starts either after the end of the program or
with the beginning of the program. The former approach excludes the treatment
period from the employment history when evaluating the success of the respective
treatment because treatment is viewed as time spent outside of the labor market.
This exclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory since labor market history continues,
especially so for the nonparticipants. In contrast, the second approach views the
treatment just as a di®erent nonemployment state while searching for a job.
The start of the evaluation period depends also upon the outcome variables consid-
ered. For employment rates and reemployment probabilities, the evaluation period
starts one month after the last or the ¯rst month of the treatment depending on
whether evaluation starts after or at the beginning of the treatment. For proba-
bilities to remain employed, the evaluation period starts one month later than for
the other two outcome variables, since we ¯rst have to observe employed former
participants. We choose the length of the evaluation period to be 36 months (as far
as being observed in the data set { otherwise set to missing). As preprogram pe-
riod, we take 18 months before the beginning of the treatment. For the incremental
e®ect of TR{TR and TR{JC, the preprogram period is taken before the beginning
of the second treatment and for the combined e®ect before the beginning of the ¯rst
treatment.
Based on the estimated propensity scores, we construct matched samples of par-
ticipants and comparable \nonparticipants" (matched nonparticipants) both during
the preprogram and the evaluation period. Alignment occurs in the same calendar
month. The characteristics and outcomes of matched nonparticipants are the ¯tted
values obtained by the local linear kernel regression of characteristics and outcomes,
respectively, on the estimated propensity score in the sample of nonparticipants as a
whole. Table 3 and 4 give evidence on the balancing properties in the matched sam-
ples for the two cases FTR and TR{TR (combined e®ect). The ¯rst column shows
the average characteristics in the whole sample. The remaining columns show the
average characteristics conditional upon employment state in the previous month.
For example, when calculating the average characteristics for the previously nonem-
ployed, the individual contribution to the mean characteristics is weighted by the
number of months the individual's state was nonemployment during the time period
under consideration. For the matched nonparticipants, the average reported uses all
available observations.
Table 3 and 4 show that participants are younger than the nonparticipants and that
women participate at a higher rate in training than men. There is no clear cut di®er-
ence in the skill distribution. It is evident, that the matching process balances well
19the characteristics of the participants and the matched nonparticipants conditional
upon employment status in the previous month. For example, 27% of the previously
nonemployed nonparticipants were aged between 25 and 34 in 1990, whereas 40%
of the participants belonged to this age group. In the matched sample, 36% of the
matched nonparticipants belong to this age group. The balancing works especially
well for the previously employed in all cases and for the previously nonemployed in
most cases. However, the labor market region does not seem perfectly balanced for
the latter group.
Furthermore, table 3 and 4 shed some light on the di®erences in characteristics across
employment states in the previous month. Previously employed participants are
younger than previously nonemployed. Male participants were more often previously
employed compared to females. In the case of FTR, previously employed participants
more often have a university education.
4.3 Speci¯cation of Outcome Equation
In the matched samples, the CDiD(HR) estimators are based on a °exible semi-
parametric linear probability model for the employment dummy as outcome vari-
able. The state of nonemployment includes the participation in ALMP programs
such that previous and subsequent participation in a program are both accounted
for as nonemployment. We estimate an average employment e®ect of a program
relative to all possible nonemployment states for the treated individuals thus esti-
mating TT (with CDiDHR conditioned on the employment status in the previous
month). For CDiDHR, we also control for observed, time{invariant characteristics
Xi in the outcome equation. The Xi variables enter the equation as deviations from
their averages in the treatment sample.
We assume treatment of individual i begins in period ¿ and we consider the em-
ployment outcome Y before the begin of treatment t0 = ¡18;:::;¡ad ¡ 1, as well
as during the time of Ashenfelter's Dip and the evaluation period of 36 months
t1 = ¡ad;:::;¡1;1;:::;36. Now, t0 is de¯ned relative to the start of the treat-
ment, whereas the de¯nition of t1 depends on the evaluation perspective and the
success criterion. When then evaluation starts at the begin of the program then
t1 is measured relative to ¿ in case the unconditional employment probability or
the reemployment probability are the outcome variables, whereas t1 is measured
relative to ¿ + 1 in case of the probability to remain employed. However, when the
evaluation starts after the end of the program ¿ is replaced by the last month of the
program.
We estimate the following three steps both for CDiD (sample of all participants)
and CDiDHR (separately depending on the employment status in the previous
month):
201. We calculate the average long{run preprogram di®erence between participant
i (treatment starts in ¿) and comparable nonparticipants as
^ ai;¿ =
1
18 ¡ ad(¿)
¡ad(¿)¡1 X
t0=¡18
(Y
0
i;t0 ¡
X
j
wi;jY
0
j;t0):
2. Then, ^ ai;¿ is subtracted from the di®erence during Ashenfelter's Dip and dur-
ing the evaluation period resulting in the following model to estimate the
treatment e®ects (I(:) denotes the indicator function, ºi;t1 the error term)
Y
1
i;t1 ¡
X
j
wi;jY
0
j;t1 ¡ ^ ai;¿ =
36 X
s=¡ad(¿)
±sI(t1 = s) (7)
+(°
ad
1 ¿ + °
ad
2 ¿
2)I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0) + (°
po
1 ¿ + °
po
2 ¿
2)I(t1 > 0) + ºi;t1 :
For CDiDHR, we include deviations of the Xi characteristics from their average
in the treatment sample as additional regressors in equation (7).
3. The average long{run preprogram di®erences ^ ai;¿ are regressed on a second
order polynomial in the starting month of the treatment. We will report the
predictions from this regression
^ ®(¿) = ®0 + ®1¿ + ®2¿
2 (8)
to illustrate how the average long{run preprogram di®erences (´ residual se-
lection e®ect due to permanent individual speci¯c e®ects) between participants
and nonparticipants after matching depend upon the timing of the program.
The following de¯nitions complement the description:
®0;®1;®2 coe±cients measuring the long{run preprogram di®erences
depending upon the month when the program starts ¿,
ad(¿) month before the begin of the program when Ashenfelter's
Dip starts depending upon ¿,
±s;°ad
1 ;°ad
2 ;°
po
1 ;°
po
2 coe±cients modeling the DiD e®ect relative to the long{run
preprogram di®erences ^ ai;¿, and
wi;j weights implementing local linear kernel regression on the
estimated propensity score.
Estimating equation (7) as a linear regression, the CDiD(HR) estimators are im-
plemented in a semiparametric way by including the employment situation before
treatment in the dummy regression of outcomes and by allowing the e®ect of the
program to depend both upon the time since treatment (t1 > 0) and upon the be-
gin of the program ¿. The long{run preprogram employment di®erences ^ ai;¿ prove
critical for the alignment of the CDiD(HR) estimators. Dummy variables for the
e®ect of Ashenfelter's Dip are included to capture the decline in the employment
21probability shortly before the program. The speci¯cation allows the employment
di®erences before and after the program to depend in a °exible way upon ¿. Also
the length of Ashenfelter's Dip is allowed to depend upon the time when the program
starts. During the period shortly after uni¯cation, it is likely that the dip is fairly
short since program participation could not have been anticipated long before and
participation rules were applied in a very lax way. The situation changes with the
occurrence of high unemployment when people realized that labor market problems
were quite severe and that ALMP at a large scale was likely to be a permanent
feature of the labor market.
To capture Ashenfelter's Dip, the following heuristic approach is chosen. For the ¯rst
program, a visual inspection of the average employment di®erences between treated
and matched controls before and after the program as a function of the time when
the program starts indicates that the dip occurs during one to two months in 90/91
and increases over time to something of at most six months for TR and to at most
nine months for JC. In order to obtain a lower bound for the employment e®ect of a
program (the employment of the future participants decreases during the dip), we are
conservative in de¯ning ad(¿). Before November 90, we set ad(¿) = ¡1. Between
November 1990 and July 1994, ad(¿) increases linearly in absolute value from 2
months to 6 months for TR and 9 months for JC, respectively, where ad(¿) is rounded
to the nearest integer. After July 1994, ad(¿) remains constant. Our approach is
conservative in the sense that taking a shorter period for Ashenfelter's Dip would
e®ectively result a higher di®erence{in{di®erences estimate of the treatment e®ect.
For a program, which started in ¿, the following expression captures both the es-
timate for the disproportionately decline in employment during Ashenfelter's Dip
and the estimated TT after the program
DiD(t1;¿) =
(
±t1 + °ad
1 ¿ + °ad
2 ¿2 for ¡ad(¿) · t1 · ¡1
±t1 + °
po
1 ¿ + °
po
2 ¿2 t1 = 1;:::;36 : (9)
If we assume for CDiDHR that the linear speci¯cation of the outcome equation in
the Xi characteristics holds exactly, then DiD(t1;¿) estimates the TT conditional
on previous employment status while integrating out the distribution of the Xi in
the treatment sample, see also section 3.3.
For the multiple, sequential treatments, DiD(t1;¿) estimates the incremental em-
ployment e®ect of the second treatment when the begin of the second program is
taken as the begin of the treatment. The combined e®ect of the program sequence
is obtained taking the begin of the ¯rst program. For the incremental e®ect, the
e®ect of a ¯rst treatment is possibly included in the permanent preprogram e®ect
for the participants. Since all TT's are estimated for the speci¯c selection of indi-
viduals participating in a certain treatment, it is clear that the TT for FTR and
the incremental TT do not have to add up to the combined e®ect of the treatment
sequence.
224.4 Estimated Treatment E®ects
Before turning to the CDiD(HR) estimates for the treatments considered, we dis-
cuss the outcomes in the matched sample for the treatment FTR. Figure 7 reports
the average di®erences in employment rates for the matched sample with individ-
uals starting treatment in the two{year periods 1990/91, 1991/92, etc. If the CIA
E(Y 0jD = 1;X) = E(Y 0jD = 0;X) did actually hold with respect to the time
invariant characteristics Xi, then the average di®erences in employment rates for
the matched samples would be a proper estimate of TT. Right after treatment,
the employment rates of the participants are between 40 and 60 percentage points
(ppoints) lower that for comparable nonparticipants. There is a noticeable recovery
for the participants afterwards { basically the time path re°ects the changes for
participants since employment rates for nonparticipants are almost constant { but
the di®erence comes nowhere close to zero except at the end for 1997/98 (the latter
can be dismissed since it is based on a very small number of cases). Even three years
after treatment, employment rates are still between 20 (90/91) and 40 (mid to late
90s) ppoints lower than for comparable nonparticipants. Thus, under the CIA as
stated above one had to conclude that FTR results in a considerable reduction of
employment rates, which is a common result found in the literature when matching
is based on observable characteristics (see the survey in Hagen/Steiner, 2000).
Considering the preprogram e®ects in ¯gure 7 raises a number of issues, which are
addressed by our CDiD(HR) estimators, and could lead to a di®erent conclusion.
While in 1990/91 there is no preprogram di®erence 13 to 18 months before the treat-
ment, long{run preprogram di®erences in the order of 10 to 20 ppoints exist for later
years. We take this as an indication for the importance of remaining unobservable
di®erences in the matched sample. Thus, our CDiD(HR) estimators take account
of possible individual speci¯c e®ects. It is also apparent here that a simple CDiD
estimate based on the di®erence between long{run postprogram and long{run pre-
program outcomes will result in a negative estimate for TT (as we will see in the
following). There is also a strong decline in employment rates shortly before the
program starts and the decline starts earlier in the later years. In 1990/91, the
decline starts within the last six months before the treatment and the average dif-
ferences immediately before the start of the program amount to 33 ppoints, whereas
in 1997/98 the employment rate of the treated declines already 16 months before
the treatment. We take this as an indication for Ashenfelter's Dip which a credi-
ble di®erence{in{di®erences estimator has to take account of. Basing CDiD on the
di®erence between postprogram outcomes and preprogram outcomes shortly before
the begin of the program would erroneously result in a positive estimate for TT.
Finally, analyzing employment rates entails the danger that one misses the state
dependence in employment. The continuous decline before the program and the
recovery process after the program suggest that employment rates do not adjust
instantaneously. Thus, one should check for state dependence as well.
23In the following we discuss the results obtained by CDiD and CDiDHR for the treat-
ments considered. We mainly rely on graphical illustrations of the DiD estimates
in equation (9) and the average preprogram levels ^ ai;¿. To avoid estimates which
are based on the extrapolation of the parametric model in equation (7), our graph-
ical illustrations only report point estimates representing at least 10 observations.
Tables 5{11 report all the estimated coe±cients.
4.4.1 CDiD Results
Figure 8 depicts the estimated CDiD employment e®ects DiD(t1;¿) in equation
(9) for FTR20 during the evaluation period t1 = 1;;:::;36 and for the period of
Ashenfelter's Dip t1 = ¡ad(¿);:::;¡1. We only report the results for the evaluation
period starting after the end of the program. The e®ects for the evaluation period
starting at the begin of the program are also similar in nature. To illustrate the
changes over time, the estimates are shown in four separate graphs for the starting
dates ¿ being the month of December in the years 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996.
The thick, changing line in the graphs represents the estimated DiD(t1;¿) for t1 =
¡ad(¿);:::;36. The dotted lines around represent the 95%{con¯dence interval. The
constant line with dotted lines around represents the estimated long{run preprogram
di®erences ^ ®(¿) (\alpha") with associated 95%{con¯dence interval. The con¯dence
intervals are based on the bootstrap covariance estimates.21
For all cases, the CDiD employment e®ects of FTR prove signi¯cantly negative dur-
ing the postprogram period, as to be expected from ¯gure 7. However, the negative
employment e®ect becomes weaker over time. For the treatment starting in 1990,
we estimate an e®ect -14 ppoints 36 months after the treatment, the correspond-
ing estimate for the year 1996 is -10 ppoints. Our estimates also clearly show that
the employment rates become considerably lower shortly before the program starts
(Ashenfelter's Dip) and this e®ect becomes more pronounced over time. There are
also important changes in the long{run preprogram di®erences over time. For par-
ticipants starting treatment in 1990, ^ ®(¿) is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
For 1992, we ¯nd already signi¯cantly reduced long{run preprogram di®erences (-16
ppoints) and this feature becomes more important over time (1996: -22 ppoints).
This ¯nding corresponds to training programs becoming more focussed on groups
with severe problems of ¯nding regular employment during the course of the 1990s,
see section 2.
20Since we consider the CDiDHR estimates more credible, we do not report here the CDiD
results for the treatments TR{TR and TR{JC to save space. Also for the same reason, we only
report the FTR results for the evaluation period starting after the end of the program.
21When comparing the bootstrap standard errors to conventional heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors, we ¯nd that bootstrap standard errors of both DiD(t1;¿) and ^ ®(¿) are higher,
the increase being stronger for the latter. This is also the case for the CDiDHR estimates.
244.4.2 CDiDHR Results
The CDiDHR esimates take the state dependence in the employment process explic-
itly into account. The outcome variable used is either the reemployment probability
of the previously nonemployed or the probability to remain employed for the previ-
ously employed. Figures 9 to 20 display the estimated CDiDHR employment e®ects
DiD(t1;¿) in equation (9). All graphs for CDiDHR are organized in the same way
as described above for CDiD referring to ¯gure 8.
Beginning with the treatment FTR, ¯gure 9 summarizes the estimated TT on the
reemployment probability. Evaluation starts after the ¯rst month of the program.
The ¯rst graph of ¯gure 9 shows the employment e®ects of a FTR treatment which
began in December 1990. We ¯nd positive employment e®ects during the evalua-
tion period, which are, however, rarely signi¯cant. For example, one year after the
program started the participants have a 4 ppoints higher reemployment probabil-
ity than in the nonparticipation case. These positive e®ects of a FTR vanish for
programs starting later. For December 1994 and later, the e®ect takes sometimes
negative values, which are signi¯cant shortly after the program started. This is not
too surprising since one would expect a reduced search e®ort when the program has
just started. During Ashenfelter's Dip, we ¯nd a slight decline in the reemployment
probability for the group of participants. This decline is not signi¯cant in most cases
and it is much less pronounced than for the CDiD employment e®ects. The long{
run preprogram di®erence is signi¯cantly negative shortly after the reuni¯cation (-6
ppoints), it becomes less negative over time, and it is e®ectively zero for Decem-
ber 1996. This is in contrast to the CDiD results where the long{run preprogram
di®erence does increase over time.
Letting the evaluation period start after the end of the program, ¯gure 10 naturally
shows more positive e®ects on the reemployment chances of former participants.
Also for all cases there is a signi¯cantly positive spike in the ¯rst month after treat-
ment. This spike can not be interpreted as pure employment e®ect. This is because
it could re°ect the endogenous, premature termination of the program due to a job
o®er and then the clock starts to run. However, we also observe smaller but signi¯-
cantly positive program e®ects after the ¯rst month. For example, 12 months after
the program the reemployment probability increased by approximately 8 ppoints.
For later starting dates, the positive e®ects are reduced and more often insigni¯cant.
FTR can have di®erent e®ects on the probability to remain employed. Figure 11
provides results when the evaluation period starts two months after the begin of
the program. The estimated e®ect is close to zero for programs which start in
December 1990. However, for later starting dates, the e®ect becomes signi¯cantly
positive. For example, one year after the program started in December 1996 the
probability to remain employed increases by approximately 6 ppoints. Ashenfelter's
25Dip is very pronounced here with strong signi¯cantly negative e®ects. Anticipation
but also participation rules might play a role here. Shortly after the uni¯cation,
the long{run preprogram di®erence is slightly negative and signi¯cant. It becomes
more negative in later periods (-5 ppoints for programs which started in December
1996). In contrast to the results for the reemployment probability, the preprogram
e®ects for the probability to remain employed are very similar in nature to the CDiD
results above. Changing the evaluation period to start two months after the begin
of the program, the results for the probability to remain employed do not change
qualitatively (see ¯gure 12).
Naturally the question arises, why the results di®er for the two outcome variables,
reemployment probability and probability to remain employed. We think that the
results are driven mainly by changes in the content of the training programs over
time. Shortly after uni¯cation a large part of training consisted in short courses
mainly aiming at increasing the placement potential, see section 2.3. This could be
an explanation for the small positive e®ect on the reemployment probability. How-
ever, later on, the composition of training courses changed towards longer courses
intended to provide substantive skills. These additional skills could improve the
quality of the match between participants and employers thus increasing the em-
ployment stability, once a participant ¯nds a job. However, these additional skills
do not seem to help ¯nding a job at a faster rate.
Also, changes in the search behavior of East Germans due to a better understanding
of the labor market and the bene¯t system in uni¯ed Germany might play a role
for the di®erences. Shortly after uni¯cation, unemployed East Germans, not being
used to a labor market in a market economy, probably tended to accept quickly
a new job without focussing on wages and a high expected job duration. As a
result, a positive e®ect of training programs might show up in an increase of their
reemployment probability rather than in an increase of the probability to remain
employed. Later on, individuals searching for a job became perhaps more aware
of the importance of ¯nding a `good' job, which is not only important for their
job stability, but also for the level of potential future unemployment bene¯ts being
de¯ned by the earnings in the last job. In addition, the entitlement for transfer
payments is prolonged by taking part in a training program for some time after
the program, lowering the opportunity costs of job search for participants compared
to other unemployed individuals. Thus, participants tended to search longer to
¯nd a `better' job match resulting in a positive e®ect on the probability to remain
employed.
However, an important caveat regarding the interpretation of the CDiDHR results
is in order here. Since our estimated TT conditions on previous employment, it is
likely that the estimates for the probability to remain employed overestimate and
the estimates for the reemployment probability underestimate the true TT for the
FTR treatment sample as a whole, see section 3.3. For this group, it might well be
26the case that reemployment chances increase on average and the positive e®ect on
employment stability is smaller.
Another feature of the results which should be explained are the changes in the
long{run preprogram di®erences. The CDiDHR estimator matches participants and
nonparticipants month by month conditional upon the same employment status
in the previous month. Shortly after the uni¯cation the labor market was quite
turbulent. Everybody faced a high risk of becoming unemployed, resulting in a
relatively small di®erence in the long{run preprogram di®erence in the probability to
remain employed. However, some individuals found quickly another job and did not
participate in a training program, leading to a large long{run preprogram di®erence
in the reemployment probability at the begin of the 90's. Later on, unemployment
became persistent. The di®erence in transitions out of nonemployment between
participants and nonparticipants was then less pronounced.22 The change in the
long{run preprogramm di®erences in the probability to remain employed most likely
re°ects the stricter targeting of labor market policy on unemployed individuals.
Let us now turn to the results for the multiple, sequential treatments TR{TR and
TR{JC. For the combined e®ect, the evaluation period starts at the begin of the
respective program sequence, whereas for the incremental e®ect it starts at the begin
of the second treatment. Figures 13, 15, 17, and 19 show the estimates for the com-
bined e®ects. The combined e®ects on the transition probabilities are mostly close
to zero and always insigni¯cant. This implies that ex ante it was not a successful
strategy on average to assign the group of participants to the program sequences
TR{TR or TR{JC. Also the incremental e®ects on the reemployment probability
are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (¯gures 14 and 18). However, we do ¯nd sig-
ni¯cantly positive incremental e®ects for the probability to remain employed (¯gures
16 and 20), especially for TR{JC. Note that the number of preprogram observations
conditioning on being employed in the previous month is particularly small in these
cases. Taken literally, the results obtained imply that the participation in a sec-
ond program after a ¯rst training program improved employment stability for the
group of participants. Put di®erently, even though the two treatments combined do
not appear successful ex ante, ex post after the ¯rst training program, the second
program seems partly successful.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the average employment e®ects for participants in Public
Sponsored Training in East Germany during the time period 1990 to 1999. Mod-
eling employment as a state{dependent outcome variable, we develop a new semi-
22Note that this explanation of the changes in the long{run preprogram di®erence does not
violate the assumption of permanent ¯xed e®ects since participants change over time.
27parametric conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator for the treatment e®ect.
For the implementation of this estimator, we use the transition rates between em-
ployment and nonemployment as our outcome variables and we compare the results
with the e®ects on the employment rate per se. We account for the likely occur-
rence of Ashenfelter's Dip caused by anticipation e®ects and institutional program
participation rules. In addition, we develop a heuristic approach to estimate the
e®ects of multiple sequential program participation. Thus, we estimate the e®ect
of treatment{on{the{treated for individuals who participated in training as their
¯rst treatment. We also consider the cases where participation in a second training
program or in a job creation scheme occurs afterwards. We take account of the
sampling error in matching by bootstrapping.
We ¯nd negative e®ects of training on the employment probability. However, tak-
ing account of the state dependency of the employment process, the bleak picture
concerning the e®ects of training brightens. This is especially the case for the reem-
ployment probabilities. Concerning training programs which took place shortly after
reuni¯cation, we ¯nd some positive program e®ects on the reemployment probability
- although we have been twice conservative in modeling the e®ects. First, our align-
ment of the di®erence{in{di®erences estimation on a long{run preprogram di®erence
is conservative (which is of course also true for the other estimates). Secondly, due
to the potential positive correlation between the individual speci¯c and the program
e®ect when being nonemployed in the previous month, for which we do not control,
we estimate a lower bound for the reemployment probability. Thus, our results indi-
cate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate and more informative than
using unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success cri-
terion might result in misleading conclusions concerning the e®ectiveness of ALMP
programs.
Further results include that the program e®ects depend heavily on the time the
programs took place corresponding to the institutional changes during the 1990s.
Combined sequences of two programs with a ¯rst training program (e.g. a combina-
tion \training ¯rst and then job experience through a Job Creation program") are
not successful from an ex ante point of view. In contrast, the incremental e®ects of
the second treatment appear to have slightly positive e®ects on the probability to
remain employed. Again, there is no positive e®ect on the reemployment probability
when being nonemployed.
Overall, our results are not as negative as previous results in the literature and
it is unlikely that training on average reduces considerably the future employment
chances of participants. We also ¯nd noticeable di®erences among di®erent treat-
ment types. At the same time, it remains questionable whether on average training
programs are justi¯ed in light of the large costs incurred. Our study makes some
methodological progress, particularly regarding modeling the dynamic employment
process in the context of program evaluation. In future research, we intend to re-
28¯ne the estimation of the unconditional e®ect of treatment{on{the{treated. Finally,
our results are also of interest for other transformation countries considering the
introduction of training programs as part of ALMP.
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Figure 1: Entries into Training in East Germany, Annual Totals
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Figure 2: Participation Stocks in Training and Expenditure per Participant / Year,
Annual Average
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32Figure 3: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR { Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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33Figure 4: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR { Employment
in Previous Month
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34Figure 5: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for TR{TR { Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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35Figure 6: Overlap of Distributions of the Propensity Score Index for TR{TR {
Employment in Previous Month
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36Figure 7: Di®erences in Outcome Variable (Matched Sample): First TR Beginning
in Two{Year{Interval 90/91,...,97/98
First Program is TR { Di®erences in Outcome Variable after Matching
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37Figure 8: Employment E®ects of FTR { CDiD { Evaluation Starts after End of
Treatment
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8Figure 9: Employment E®ects of FTR { CDiDHR { Nonemployment in the Previous
Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
39Figure 10: Employment E®ects of FTR { CDiDHR { Nonemployment in the Previ-
ous Month { Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
40Figure 11: Employment E®ects of FTR { CDiDHR { Employment in the Previous
Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
41Figure 12: Employment E®ects of FTR { CDiDHR { Employment in the Previous
Month { Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
42Figure 13: Combined Employment E®ects of TR{TR { CDiDHR { Nonemployment
in Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
43Figure 14: Incremental Employment E®ects of TR{TR { CDiDHR { Nonemploy-
ment in Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
44Figure 15: Combined Employment E®ects of TR{TR { CDiDHR { Employment in
Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
45Figure 16: Incremental Employment E®ects of TR-TR { CDiDHR { Employment
in Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
46Figure 17: Combined Employment E®ects of TR{JC { CDiDHR { Nonemployment
in Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
47Figure 18: Incremental Employment E®ects of TR{JC { CDiDHR { Nonemployment
in Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
48Figure 19: Combined Employment E®ects of TR{JC { CDiDHR { Employment in
Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
49Figure 20: Incremental Employment E®ects of TR-JC { CDiDHR { Employment in
Previous Month { Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
50Table 1: Program Participation (number of individuals) in the LMM{SA during
1990 and 1999
One Program JCa TRb
At least once 689 1021
As ¯rst program 484 889
Program Sequencesc JC{JC JC{TR JC alone
First and Second 105 113 266
Program Sequences TR{JC TR{TR training alone
First and Second 176 150 563
a: Training b: Job Creation Scheme
c: For instance, TR{JC indicates that a ¯rst participation in training and a
second treatment in JC occurred
Table 2: Propensity Score Estimations
FTR TR{TR TR{JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -1.036 ( 0.161 ) -2.084 ( 0.140) -1.625 ( 0.211 )
Age in 1990: Age 25{34 is omitted category
Age 35{44 -0.094 ( 0.047 ) -0.078 ( 0.081) 0.140 ( 0.084 )
Age 45{50 -0.311 ( 0.058 ) -0.342 ( 0.109 ) 0.224 ( 0.094 )
Labor Market Region: Dessau is missing category
Halberstadt -0.109 ( 0.090 ) -0.253 ( 0.164) -0.026 ( 0.144 )
Halle -0.163 ( 0.077 ) -0.126 ( 0.128 ) -0.423 ( 0.137 )
Magdeburg -0.126 ( 0.073 ) -0.121 ( 0.121 ) -0.140 ( 0.117 )
Merseburg -0.110 ( 0.082 ) -0.156 ( 0.140 ) -0.176 ( 0.136 )
Sangerhausen 0.009 ( 0.087 ) -0.093 ( 0.149 ) 0.154 ( 0.132 )
Stendal -0.214 ( 0.097 ) -0.414 ( 0.190 ) -0.181 ( 0.159 )
Wittenberg -0.146 ( 0.111 ) -0.183 ( 0.193 ) 0.036 ( 0.166 )
Professional education (all): Unskilled, semi{skilled or other skills
are missing category
Skilled Worker 0.097 ( 0.156 ) - ( - ) -0.645 ( 0.211 )
Craftsman -0.020 ( 0.176 ) -0.182 ( 0.269 ) -0.915 ( 0.312 )
Technical college 0.271 ( 0.173 ) 0.129 ( 0.221 ) -0.391 ( 0.244 )
University education 0.204 ( 0.159 ) 0.288 ( 0.144 ) -0.295 ( 0.204 )
Professional education (women)
Skilled worker 0.500 ( 0.063 ) 0.762 ( 0.119 ) 0.747 ( 0.122 )
Craftsman 0.819 ( 0.182 ) 0.630 ( 0.397 ) 1.295 ( 0.322 )
Technical college 0.035 ( 0.104 ) 0.456 ( 0.214 ) 0.074 ( 0.190 )
University education 0.137 ( 0.082 ) 0.191 ( 0.143 ) 0.296 ( 0.127 )
51Table 3: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation
in FTR, Evaluation Starts at the Beginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar{ Parti{ Matched Nonpar{ Parti{ Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev{ averaged over prev{
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25{34 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.43
Age 35{44 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41
Age 45{50 0.23 0.37 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.16
Dessau 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14
Halberstadt 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09
Halle 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.18
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24
Merseburg 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.11
Stendal 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Unskilled, semi- or other skilled 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.41 0.46 0.46
Craftsman 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06
Technical college 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20
University education 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.27 0.27
Female 0.48 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.58
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.17 0.27 0.29
Craftswoman 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Female and technical college 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14
Female and university education 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13
52Table 4: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation
in TR{TR (Combined E®ect), Evaluation Starts at the Be-
ginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar{ Parti{ Matched Nonpar{ Parti{ Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev{ averaged over prev{
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25{34 0.37 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.44
Age 35{44 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.42
Age 45{50 0.23 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.15
Dessau 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.15
Halberstadt 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07
Halle 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.25
Merseburg 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.10
Stendal 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Unskilled, semi- or other skilled 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.62 0.41 0.52 0.53
Craftsman 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04
Technical college 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.21
University education 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.22
Female 0.48 0.57 0.79 0.79 0.46 0.68 0.67
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.56 0.18 0.36 0.40
Craftswomen 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Female and technical college 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17
Female and university education 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11
53Table 5: Coe±cient estimates for CDiD
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap { s.e.
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const 0.109538 ( 0.031724 )
¿ -0.010506 ( 1.62E-03 )
¿2 7.93E-05 ( 1.43E-05 )
Outcome{equation
I(t1 = ¡6) 0.015666 ( 0.051966 )
I(t1 = ¡5) -0.053436 ( 0.051006 )
I(t1 = ¡4) -0.098527 ( 0.049093 )
I(t1 = ¡3) -0.147712 ( 0.047869 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.18752 ( 0.046773 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.250343 ( 0.047172 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.331277 ( 0.072718 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.310247 ( 0.073391 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.293056 ( 0.072545 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.287756 ( 0.07347 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.27302 ( 0.073619 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.265125 ( 0.073884 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.254978 ( 0.074463 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.24921 ( 0.074907 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.236731 ( 0.074903 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.222417 ( 0.074433 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.210578 ( 0.074053 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.196867 ( 0.074775 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.181907 ( 0.074531 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.178723 ( 0.07364 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.167247 ( 0.074247 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.162639 ( 0.073198 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.157038 ( 0.073196 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.150819 ( 0.072676 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.144263 ( 0.073454 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.146938 ( 0.073612 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.148433 ( 0.074218 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.136203 ( 0.073933 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.139326 ( 0.074613 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.149236 ( 0.074444 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.154556 ( 0.072969 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.146676 ( 0.073267 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.145388 ( 0.073807 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.132021 ( 0.0731 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.137155 ( 0.073106 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.133065 ( 0.073812 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.131043 ( 0.073167 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.132572 ( 0.072657 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.125412 ( 0.072885 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.122935 ( 0.073045 )
<continued on next page>
54Table 5: Coe±cient estimates <continued>
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap { s.e.
I(t1 = 35) -0.117068 ( 0.074169 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.113323 ( 0.073629 )
AD : ¿ -4.41E-03 ( 2.01E-03 )
AD : ¿2 1.53E-05 ( 1.72E-05 )
PO : ¿ -2.89E-03 ( 3.63E-03 )
PO : ¿2 3.63E-05 ( 3.49E-05 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(ad(¿) · ¿ < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(¿ > 0)
comb.: combined e®ect of ¯rst and second program
incr.: incremental e®ect of second program
55Table 6: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { FTR { Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const -0.065 ( 0.023 ) -0.065 ( 0.023 )
t 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 ) 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 )
t2 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 ) 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡6) -0.027 ( 0.049 ) -0.035 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = ¡5) -0.034 ( 0.050 ) -0.041 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = ¡4) -0.033 ( 0.049 ) -0.042 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = ¡3) -0.039 ( 0.048 ) -0.048 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.040 ( 0.048 ) -0.049 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.043 ( 0.048 ) -0.052 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.029 ( 0.037 ) 0.314 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.023 ( 0.037 ) 0.090 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.023 ( 0.036 ) 0.097 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.034 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.030 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.041 ( 0.036 ) 0.110 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.055 ( 0.038 ) 0.099 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.042 ( 0.037 ) 0.114 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.037 ( 0.038 ) 0.120 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.054 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 11) 0.040 ( 0.037 ) 0.101 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.053 ( 0.038 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.063 ( 0.039 ) 0.125 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.063 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.058 ( 0.038 ) 0.109 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.046 ( 0.038 ) 0.105 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.070 ( 0.039 ) 0.117 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 18) 0.050 ( 0.038 ) 0.094 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.064 ( 0.039 ) 0.102 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.097 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.049 ( 0.039 ) 0.089 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.060 ( 0.039 ) 0.103 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.092 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.059 ( 0.037 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.071 ( 0.039 ) 0.115 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.101 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.113 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.054 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.087 ( 0.040 ) 0.098 ( 0.048 )
<continued on next page>
56Table 6: Coe±cient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 31) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.097 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.068 ( 0.040 ) 0.095 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.076 ( 0.038 ) 0.115 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 34) 0.045 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.065 ( 0.041 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.077 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
AD:¿ 1.83E-03 ( 1.98E-03 ) 2.21E-03 ( 1.98E-03 )
AD:¿2 -2.08E-05 ( 1.76E-05 ) -2.40E-05 ( 1.76E-05 )
PO:¿ -1.19E-03 ( 1.31E-03 ) -2.57E-03 ( 1.65E-03 )
PO:¿2 5.28E-06 ( 1.05E-05 ) 1.61E-05 ( 1.35E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 6.54E-03 ( 1.65E-02 ) -7.19E-03 ( 1.69E-02 )
Age 45{50 -1.40E-02 ( 1.62E-02 ) -2.81E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Halberstadt 5.19E-04 ( 1.74E-02 ) -1.90E-02 ( 1.90E-02 )
Halle -2.33E-02 ( 2.48E-02 ) -3.49E-02 ( 3.17E-02 )
Magdeburg 5.95E-03 ( 1.53E-02 ) -4.47E-03 ( 1.70E-02 )
Merseburg -5.56E-03 ( 1.82E-02 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Sangerhausen 1.42E-02 ( 1.72E-02 ) 2.92E-03 ( 1.96E-02 )
Stendal -2.51E-02 ( 2.95E-02 ) -4.48E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Wittenberg -8.81E-02 ( 7.32E-02 ) -1.15E-01 ( 8.92E-02 )
Skilled Worker -2.78E-02 ( 3.32E-02 ) 2.46E-02 ( 2.79E-02 )
Craftsman 5.39E-05 ( 2.38E-02 ) 3.03E-02 ( 3.50E-02 )
Technical college -2.69E-02 ( 3.04E-02 ) 1.11E-02 ( 4.19E-02 )
University education -3.35E-02 ( 3.40E-02 ) -1.89E-02 ( 4.15E-02 )
Female skilled worker 1.86E-02 ( 2.60E-02 ) -2.01E-02 ( 2.09E-02 )
Craftswoman 2.37E-02 ( 4.28E-02 ) 1.74E-02 ( 4.94E-02 )
Female and technical college 2.12E-02 ( 2.88E-02 ) -5.28E-03 ( 3.83E-02 )
Female and university education 2.70E-02 ( 3.25E-02 ) 3.04E-02 ( 4.04E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
57Table 7: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { FTR { Employ-
ment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const 0.005 ( 0.006 ) 0.005 ( 0.006 )
t -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 ) -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 )
t2 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 ) 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡6) -0.011 ( 0.050 ) -0.008 ( 0.051 )
I(t1 = ¡5) -0.080 ( 0.048 ) -0.078 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = ¡4) -0.068 ( 0.043 ) -0.068 ( 0.044 )
I(t1 = ¡3) -0.099 ( 0.039 ) -0.100 ( 0.040 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.096 ( 0.033 ) -0.097 ( 0.033 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.141 ( 0.038 ) -0.151 ( 0.038 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.016 ( 0.024 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.016 ( 0.025 ) -0.008 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.060 ( 0.043 ) -0.035 ( 0.018 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.014 ( 0.020 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.001 ( 0.025 ) -0.011 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.028 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.010 ( 0.025 ) -0.032 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.008 ( 0.024 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.012 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.010 ( 0.021 ) -0.009 ( 0.014 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.027 ( 0.022 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.020 ( 0.020 ) -0.022 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.041 ( 0.023 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.004 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.031 ( 0.023 ) -0.022 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.009 ( 0.016 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.012 ( 0.018 ) -0.004 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.030 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.022 ( 0.018 ) -0.017 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.017 ( 0.018 ) -0.021 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.018 ( 0.017 ) -0.007 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.015 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.015 ( 0.018 ) -0.033 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.020 ( 0.018 ) -0.031 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.010 ( 0.017 ) -0.017 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.005 ( 0.017 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.028 ( 0.020 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.005 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.011 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.024 ( 0.018 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
<continued on next page>
58Table 7: Coe±cient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 31) 0.001 ( 0.017 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.020 ( 0.019 ) -0.008 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.028 ( 0.021 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.010 ( 0.019 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
AD:¿ 1.27E-04 ( 1.66E-03 ) 2.62E-04 ( 1.67E-03 )
AD:¿2 -8.62E-06 ( 1.38E-05 ) -1.06E-05 ( 1.38E-05 )
PO:¿ 1.67E-03 ( 1.00E-03 ) 1.95E-03 ( 8.69E-04 )
PO:¿2 -8.36E-06 ( 9.53E-06 ) -1.15E-05 ( 8.49E-06 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 -3.48E-03 ( 9.25E-03 ) -6.46E-03 ( 8.75E-03 )
Age 45{50 2.68E-02 ( 2.66E-02 ) 2.41E-02 ( 2.21E-02 )
Halberstadt 2.14E-02 ( 1.99E-02 ) 1.81E-02 ( 1.79E-02 )
Halle 2.78E-02 ( 2.55E-02 ) 2.27E-02 ( 2.05E-02 )
Magdeburg 1.29E-02 ( 1.48E-02 ) 1.05E-02 ( 1.22E-02 )
Merseburg 2.01E-02 ( 1.54E-02 ) 3.12E-02 ( 1.44E-02 )
Sangerhausen 9.00E-03 ( 1.60E-02 ) 5.61E-03 ( 1.39E-02 )
Stendal 1.61E-02 ( 1.73E-02 ) 1.52E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Wittenberg 8.23E-03 ( 1.97E-02 ) 5.98E-03 ( 1.68E-02 )
Skilled Worker -3.27E-02 ( 3.50E-02 ) -1.22E-02 ( 3.92E-02 )
Craftsman -2.92E-02 ( 3.61E-02 ) -1.65E-02 ( 3.95E-02 )
Technical college -3.31E-02 ( 3.57E-02 ) -2.07E-03 ( 4.08E-02 )
University education -3.84E-02 ( 3.43E-02 ) -2.12E-02 ( 3.89E-02 )
Female skilled worker 4.50E-04 ( 1.84E-02 ) -2.71E-04 ( 1.55E-02 )
Craftswoman -2.15E-02 ( 3.59E-02 ) -2.87E-03 ( 2.85E-02 )
Female and technical college -2.11E-03 ( 2.15E-02 ) -8.30E-03 ( 2.28E-02 )
Female and university education 2.12E-03 ( 1.64E-02 ) 7.07E-03 ( 1.40E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
59Table 8: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { TR{TR {
nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const -0.066 ( 0.037 ) -0.011 ( 0.029 )
t 1.62E-03 ( 1.46E-03 ) -5.12E-04 ( 7.82E-04 )
t2 -1.28E-05 ( 1.31E-05 ) 5.53E-06 ( 5.35E-06 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡6) 0.013 ( 0.067 ) -0.062 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = ¡5) 0.008 ( 0.066 ) -0.052 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = ¡4) 0.013 ( 0.066 ) -0.043 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = ¡3) 0.012 ( 0.065 ) -0.059 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = ¡2) 0.009 ( 0.065 ) -0.060 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.003 ( 0.068 ) -0.069 ( 0.061 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.235 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.015 ( 0.088 ) -0.232 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.234 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.020 ( 0.089 ) -0.211 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.014 ( 0.089 ) -0.225 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.244 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.019 ( 0.089 ) -0.232 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.014 ( 0.090 ) -0.232 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.018 ( 0.093 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.222 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.018 ( 0.089 ) -0.215 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.002 ( 0.093 ) -0.211 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.011 ( 0.090 ) -0.229 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.019 ( 0.098 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.014 ( 0.096 ) -0.208 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.021 ( 0.094 ) -0.228 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.014 ( 0.091 ) -0.216 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.013 ( 0.091 ) -0.203 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.214 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.009 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.237 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.223 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.022 ( 0.090 ) -0.195 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.025 ( 0.099 ) -0.237 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.005 ( 0.092 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
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Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 29) 0.026 ( 0.097 ) -0.223 ( 0.212 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.009 ( 0.092 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.010 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.007 ( 0.089 ) -0.206 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.012 ( 0.093 ) -0.220 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) -0.221 ( 0.213 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.008 ( 0.089 ) -0.241 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
AD:¿ 1.34E-05 ( 2.95E-03 ) 1.82E-03 ( 1.57E-03 )
AD:¿2 -2.12E-06 ( 2.80E-05 ) -1.28E-05 ( 1.03E-05 )
PO:¿ 3.62E-04 ( 3.68E-03 ) 6.61E-03 ( 5.77E-03 )
PO:¿2 -3.23E-06 ( 3.36E-05 ) -4.39E-05 ( 3.84E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 -1.56E-02 ( 4.56E-02 ) -1.29E-02 ( 2.32E-02 )
Age 45{50 5.54E-03 ( 5.43E-02 ) 8.92E-03 ( 2.95E-02 )
Halberstadt 3.16E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) 5.70E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Halle 2.90E-02 ( 4.80E-02 ) 3.84E-02 ( 4.32E-02 )
Magdeburg 3.22E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 4.28E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Merseburg 2.60E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 5.02E-02 ( 5.05E-02 )
Sangerhausen 2.95E-02 ( 5.16E-02 ) 5.49E-02 ( 4.33E-02 )
Stendal 2.79E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 3.58E-02 ( 5.61E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.74E-01 ( 2.02E-01 ) 2.84E-02 ( 3.81E-02 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -8.01E-02 ( 1.34E-01 ) -1.52E-02 ( 5.37E-02 )
Technical college -7.34E-02 ( 1.19E-01 ) -4.57E-02 ( 5.38E-02 )
University education -7.28E-02 ( 1.24E-01 ) -1.35E-01 ( 9.07E-02 )
Female skilled worker - ( - ) -3.95E-02 ( 3.19E-02 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) -7.93E-03 ( 5.48E-02 )
Female and technical college -9.49E-02 ( 1.26E-01 ) 9.53E-03 ( 3.35E-02 )
Female and university education 3.06E-02 ( 6.58E-02 ) 1.20E-01 ( 6.71E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
61Table 9: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { TR{TR { Em-
ployment in Previous Month
Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.159 ( 0.055 )
t -1.19E-03 ( 7.88E-04 ) 1.58E-03 ( 2.02E-03 )
t2 9.24E-06 ( 8.27E-06 ) -7.81E-06 ( 1.61E-05 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡6) 0.134 ( 0.179 ) -0.280 ( 1.371 )
I(t1 = ¡5) 0.111 ( 0.184 ) -0.374 ( 1.368 )
I(t1 = ¡4) 0.027 ( 0.169 ) -0.350 ( 1.367 )
I(t1 = ¡3) 0.011 ( 0.157 ) -0.257 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.106 ( 0.146 ) -0.331 ( 1.343 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.058 ( 0.137 ) -0.351 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.111 ( 0.130 ) 0.207 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.108 ( 0.125 ) 0.257 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.147 ( 0.233 ) 0.243 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.075 ( 0.109 ) 0.254 ( 0.439 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.039 ( 0.103 ) 0.283 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.028 ( 0.103 ) 0.278 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.034 ( 0.101 ) 0.180 ( 0.449 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.032 ( 0.102 ) 0.279 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.030 ( 0.101 ) 0.184 ( 0.460 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.056 ( 0.104 ) 0.278 ( 0.451 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.004 ( 0.107 ) 0.288 ( 0.452 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.058 ( 0.129 ) 0.291 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.103 ( 0.131 ) 0.366 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.030 ( 0.102 ) 0.241 ( 0.454 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.030 ( 0.103 ) 0.324 ( 0.441 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.019 ( 0.102 ) 0.298 ( 0.431 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.064 ( 0.102 ) 0.286 ( 0.427 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.351 ( 0.434 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.050 ( 0.108 ) 0.344 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.012 ( 0.106 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.014 ( 0.105 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.004 ( 0.109 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.095 ) 0.336 ( 0.437 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.113 ( 0.119 ) 0.275 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.033 ( 0.098 ) 0.332 ( 0.434 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.025 ( 0.109 ) 0.333 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.042 ( 0.102 ) 0.330 ( 0.433 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.048 ( 0.102 ) 0.377 ( 0.448 )
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Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 29) 0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.402 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.016 ( 0.112 ) 0.405 ( 0.448 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.066 ( 0.103 ) 0.397 ( 0.445 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.007 ( 0.106 ) 0.330 ( 0.462 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.027 ( 0.111 ) 0.391 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.109 ) 0.390 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.033 ( 0.119 ) 0.395 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.031 ( 0.117 ) 0.392 ( 0.448 )
AD:¿ -4.09E-03 ( 6.84E-03 ) 6.09E-03 ( 3.77E-02 )
AD:¿2 1.04E-05 ( 6.51E-05 ) -2.41E-05 ( 2.40E-04 )
PO:¿ -1.40E-03 ( 5.62E-03 ) -4.71E-03 ( 1.35E-02 )
PO:¿2 2.49E-05 ( 6.86E-05 ) 4.54E-05 ( 1.02E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 1.83E-02 ( 4.14E-02 ) -7.00E-02 ( 1.77E-01 )
Age 45{50 2.07E-01 ( 1.94E-01 ) - ( - )
Halberstadt 3.78E-02 ( 8.53E-02 ) -4.41E-01 ( 6.82E-01 )
Halle 1.75E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -3.28E-01 ( 6.53E-01 )
Magdeburg 2.40E-02 ( 6.62E-02 ) -1.88E-01 ( 6.70E-01 )
Merseburg 4.97E-02 ( 7.21E-02 ) -3.11E-01 ( 6.69E-01 )
Sangerhausen -1.47E-02 ( 7.70E-02 ) -3.23E-01 ( 6.57E-01 )
Stendal -1.17E-02 ( 1.06E-01 ) -4.14E-01 ( 6.63E-01 )
Wittenberg 1.51E-01 ( 1.78E-01 ) -4.84E-01 ( 7.57E-01 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -7.76E-02 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -1.96E-01 ( 2.16E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -2.74E-01 ( 1.67E-01 ) 3.53E-01 ( 3.29E-01 )
Female skilled worker -1.05E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) 2.11E-01 ( 1.65E-01 )
Craftswoman -1.11E-01 ( 1.00E-01 ) - ( - )
Female and technical college 1.21E-01 ( 1.55E-01 ) 1.07E-01 ( 1.66E-01 )
Female and university education 1.72E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.51E-01 ( 3.64E-01 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
63Table 10: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { TR{JC {
nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const -0.050 ( 0.048 ) -0.008 ( 0.031 )
t 8.72E-04 ( 1.74E-03 ) -5.70E-04 ( 9.03E-04 )
t2 -5.37E-06 ( 1.44E-05 ) 4.76E-06 ( 6.27E-06 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡9) - ( - ) -0.013 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = ¡8) - ( - ) -0.025 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = ¡7) - ( - ) -0.032 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = ¡6) 0.007 ( 0.080 ) -0.027 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = ¡5) -0.003 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = ¡4) -0.036 ( 0.079 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = ¡3) -0.023 ( 0.081 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.025 ( 0.081 ) -0.030 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.031 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) -0.007 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.005 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.046 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.051 ( 0.085 ) 0.013 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.043 ( 0.084 ) 0.002 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.062 ( 0.086 ) 0.006 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.040 ( 0.086 ) 0.002 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.009 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.039 ( 0.085 ) 0.006 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.050 ( 0.085 ) 0.031 ( 0.057 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.024 ( 0.087 ) -0.007 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.037 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) 0.007 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.045 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) 0.014 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.034 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.014 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.029 ( 0.087 ) 0.003 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.033 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) -0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.030 ( 0.085 ) 0.059 ( 0.060 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.025 ( 0.086 ) 0.019 ( 0.057 )
<continued on next page>
64Table 10: Coe±cient estimates <continued>
Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.019 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.030 ( 0.086 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.016 ( 0.091 ) 0.018 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.036 ( 0.085 ) 0.020 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.021 ( 0.088 ) 0.024 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.048 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.030 ( 0.087 ) 0.006 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.026 ( 0.086 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.031 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.049 ( 0.085 ) 0.035 ( 0.058 )
AD:¿ 2.07E-04 ( 2.96E-03 ) 7.82E-04 ( 1.39E-03 )
AD:¿2 -1.96E-06 ( 2.63E-05 ) -6.50E-06 ( 9.68E-06 )
PO:¿ 1.16E-03 ( 3.25E-03 ) 1.53E-04 ( 1.62E-03 )
PO:¿2 -1.31E-05 ( 3.00E-05 ) -1.98E-06 ( 1.16E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 -1.96E-03 ( 3.09E-02 ) -1.85E-02 ( 1.33E-02 )
Age 45{50 -3.19E-02 ( 3.97E-02 ) 3.59E-03 ( 1.78E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.33E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 5.34E-03 ( 2.69E-02 )
Halle -1.63E-01 ( 1.47E-01 ) -4.34E-03 ( 1.97E-02 )
Magdeburg -5.78E-02 ( 4.96E-02 ) -2.13E-02 ( 2.54E-02 )
Merseburg -7.08E-02 ( 5.43E-02 ) -1.21E-02 ( 2.18E-02 )
Sangerhausen -6.33E-02 ( 4.99E-02 ) 1.08E-03 ( 1.79E-02 )
Stendal -3.89E-02 ( 5.44E-02 ) 1.63E-02 ( 3.07E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.09E-01 ( 7.63E-02 ) 2.36E-02 ( 3.27E-02 )
Skilled Worker 1.98E-02 ( 6.64E-02 ) 1.24E-02 ( 1.96E-02 )
Craftsman 7.19E-02 ( 9.11E-02 ) 2.55E-02 ( 4.87E-02 )
Technical college -6.51E-02 ( 8.33E-02 ) -1.71E-01 ( 1.75E-01 )
University education -1.21E-01 ( 1.22E-01 ) 9.95E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Female skilled worker -2.02E-02 ( 6.82E-02 ) -1.39E-02 ( 1.53E-02 )
Craftswoman -7.82E-02 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.68E-02 ( 4.82E-02 )
Female and technical college 7.32E-02 ( 8.06E-02 ) 1.69E-01 ( 1.74E-01 )
Female and university education 1.10E-01 ( 1.09E-01 ) 2.40E-03 ( 1.33E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
65Table 11: Coe±cient estimates for CDiDHR { TR{JC { Em-
ployment in Previous Month
Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long{run preprogram di®erence
Const 0.021 ( 0.016 ) -0.031 ( 0.026 )
t -2.03E-03 ( 8.81E-04 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.18E-03 )
t2 1.24E-05 ( 9.29E-06 ) 1.34E-05 ( 9.27E-06 )
Outcome{Equation
I(t1 = ¡9) - ( - ) 1.194 ( 0.639 )
I(t1 = ¡8) - ( - ) 1.234 ( 0.590 )
I(t1 = ¡7) - ( - ) 1.160 ( 0.571 )
I(t1 = ¡6) 0.170 ( 0.138 ) 1.261 ( 0.568 )
I(t1 = ¡5) -0.025 ( 0.150 ) 0.858 ( 0.597 )
I(t1 = ¡4) 0.031 ( 0.127 ) 0.883 ( 0.366 )
I(t1 = ¡3) -0.053 ( 0.110 ) 0.635 ( 0.423 )
I(t1 = ¡2) -0.040 ( 0.090 ) -0.106 ( 0.337 )
I(t1 = ¡1) -0.116 ( 0.107 ) - ( - )
I(t1 = 1) 0.076 ( 0.118 ) -0.468 ( 0.162 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.075 ( 0.118 ) -0.594 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.073 ( 0.118 ) -0.569 ( 0.176 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.059 ( 0.114 ) -0.449 ( 0.190 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.057 ( 0.114 ) -0.464 ( 0.177 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.075 ( 0.114 ) -0.476 ( 0.172 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.059 ( 0.110 ) -0.510 ( 0.167 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.065 ( 0.116 ) -0.512 ( 0.163 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.062 ( 0.112 ) -0.535 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.060 ( 0.112 ) -0.536 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.074 ( 0.149 ) -0.634 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.055 ( 0.107 ) -0.589 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.019 ( 0.111 ) -0.588 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.081 ( 0.104 ) -0.572 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.078 ( 0.149 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.079 ( 0.103 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.054 ( 0.125 ) -0.580 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.062 ( 0.149 ) -0.652 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.063 ( 0.108 ) -0.584 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.007 ( 0.127 ) -0.575 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.058 ( 0.108 ) -0.576 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.053 ( 0.107 ) -0.577 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.108 ) -0.571 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.003 ( 0.120 ) -0.535 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.011 ( 0.114 ) -0.533 ( 0.153 )
<continued on next page>
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Combined E®ect Incremental E®ect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) 0.014 ( 0.118 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.035 ( 0.121 ) -0.537 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.058 ( 0.109 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.061 ( 0.109 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.058 ( 0.133 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.063 ( 0.107 ) -0.610 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.066 ( 0.110 ) -0.539 ( 0.156 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.064 ( 0.109 ) -0.626 ( 0.158 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.028 ( 0.121 ) -0.594 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.012 ( 0.115 ) -0.598 ( 0.155 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.050 ( 0.108 ) -0.615 ( 0.156 )
AD:¿ -1.04E-03 ( 4.97E-03 ) -4.16E-02 ( 1.61E-02 )
AD:¿2 -3.15E-05 ( 5.08E-05 ) 2.65E-04 ( 1.04E-04 )
PO:¿ -1.33E-03 ( 6.70E-03 ) 2.92E-02 ( 7.02E-03 )
PO:¿2 1.04E-05 ( 7.64E-05 ) -2.27E-01 ( 3 .602536E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35{44 -3.26E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) - ( - )
Age 45{50 -1.31E-02 ( 5.81E-02 ) -2.13E-01 ( 8.14E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.15E-02 ( 7.68E-02 ) 4.53E-01 ( 1.11E-01 )
Halle -5.17E-02 ( 1.16E-01 ) 4.29E-01 ( 1.37E-01 )
Magdeburg -2.09E-02 ( 4.68E-02 ) 3.89E-01 ( 8.11E-02 )
Merseburg -7.97E-02 ( 6.90E-02 ) 1.61E-01 ( 7.59E-02 )
Sangerhausen -4.35E-03 ( 5.11E-02 ) 3.15E-01 ( 7.61E-02 )
Stendal -8.06E-02 ( 8.23E-02 ) 3.47E-01 ( 1.56E-01 )
Wittenberg -9.75E-02 ( 7.19E-02 ) 5.02E-01 ( 1.14E-01 )
Skilled Worker -1.34E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) -4.80E-01 ( 1.09E-01 )
Craftsman -9.86E-02 ( 1.25E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -2.07E-01 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -1.29E-01 ( 8.24E-02 ) - ( - )
Female skilled worker -3.71E-02 ( 5.94E-02 ) 5.56E-01 ( 1.50E-01 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) - ( - )
Female and technical college -2.24E-03 ( 9.76E-02 ) - ( - )
Female and university education -5.84E-03 ( 5.37E-02 ) -1.29E-01 ( 5.93E-02 )
Incremental E®ect of JC with conventional, heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors
due to insu±cient number of observations.
AD: Ashenfelter's Dip ´ I(¡ad(¿) · t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ´ I(t1 > 0)
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